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INTRODUCTION

Since the dramatic crash of the NASDAQ market in 2000, the idea
of “bubbles” has permeated popular thinking about the economy.
Journalists, economists, and policymakers have either warned of or
refuted the existence of speculative bubbles in U.S. real estate,1 the
Chinese stock market,2 the U.S. stock market (due to buyouts and
private-equity investments),3 and hedge funds.4 “Bubble” has become a
metaphor that seems to mean any volatile market in which prices have
risen dramatically.5 This metaphor has even entered judicial opinions.
In one prominent case, a federal judge ruled that the collapse of a
technology-stock-market bubble in 2000 was an intervening cause that
precluded relief in a securities class-action suit.6 Popular concerns over
the existence of bubbles have meshed with concerns that excessive

1.
Roger Lowenstein, On the Homefront: Pop Psychology, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Mar. 18, 2007, at 14 (comparing popular beliefs and the views of economists on
whether U.S. real-estate markets are experiencing a bubble).
2.
See, e.g., David Barboza & Keith Bradsher, Tax Increase Batters Chinese
Stocks, but There’s Little Wider Damage, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at C4 (reporting
that the Chinese stock market plummeted in response to a new transaction tax designed
to curb stock-market speculation “as a growing number of economists and analysts
warn about the danger of a market bubble.”).
3.
See, e.g., Andrew Ross Sorkin & Michael J. de la Merced, Easy Credit
Evaporates, and so Does the Market’s Buyout Frenzy, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2007, at
C1 (reporting that a “buyout bubble,” that is, speculation in takeovers and leveraged
buyouts in the U.S. stock market, popped on July 26, 2007 as credit tightened); Shawn
Tully, Why the Private Equity Bubble is Bursting, FORTUNE, Aug. 20, 2007, at 30–32,
available at http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/06/markets/privateequitybubble.fortune/
index.htm (analyzing the collapse of the “private equity bubble” that formed due to
cheap credit and frenzied investors who were “dazzled by rich returns”).
4.
See, e.g., Jenny Anderson, How This Boom Differs from the Dot-Com
Days: Hedge Funds Make Money, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2007, at C5 (noting that money
managers and the media have questioned since 2005 whether hedge-fund investments
are in a bubble and that concerns have intensified with hedge funds preparing to make
public offerings).
5.
See Econbrowser, What Is a Bubble and Is This One Now?,
http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2005/06/what_is_a_bubbl.html (June 23, 2005,
23:43) (comparing popular analysis of whether there is a U.S. housing bubble to
“Justice Potter Stewart’s position on pornography—they haven’t defined a bubble, but
they think they know it when they see it”).
6.
In re Merrill Lynch & Co., 273 F. Supp. 2d 351, 364–65, 382 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). The decision also invoked the “bespeaks caution” doctrine to preclude relief for
plaintiffs and again employed the bubble metaphor to do so. Id. at 376. For an analysis
of this decision and its implications for the loss-causation element of securities-fraud
litigation, see Jay W. Eisenhofer et al., Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and
Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based Theory of Loss Causation, 59
BUS. LAW. 1419, 1438 (2004).
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speculation and liquidity are causing severe mispricings in real-estate
and securities markets and raising the risk of market crashes.7
But the popular and even judicial use of the word “bubble” lacks
clarity and rigor, as do terms such as “excessive speculation” and
“excessive liquidity.” This imprecision may contribute to widespread
misconceptions about whether and how markets misprice assets,
particularly securities and real estate, and how the law should react to
the potential for these mispricings. In fact, these misconceptions may
influence the development of securities and financial laws as stockmarket volatility generates calls for laws and regulations to remedy
bubbles and reduce the potential for asset mispricings due to excessive
speculation.8 These proposals echo economic and legal scholarship that
has advocated laws and policies to combat excessive speculation and
thus improve the accuracy of asset pricing in financial markets.9
The following are recent examples of proposed and actual legal
rules designed, at least in part, to prevent or prick bubbles, dampen the
severity of “mispricing” during bubbles, or otherwise combat
“excessive” speculation:
• In May 2007, the Chinese government imposed a tax on
securities transactions to curb speculation in stocks as fears
rose that the Chinese stock market was in a bubble.10 This
7.
See, e.g., Chi Lo, China’s Slow but Sure Shift to Yuan Flexibility,
STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Aug. 1, 2007 (reporting that “excessive liquidity” is driving
asset-price inflation in the Chinese economy and “has boosted stock prices into bubble
territory”); Floyd Norris, A Mountain of Margin Debt May Not Be Cause for Concern,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24., 2007, at C3 (reporting that high levels of margin investing in
the stock market generated “concern of excessive speculation”).
8.
See, e.g., Jad Mouawad, Report on Amaranth Collapse Is To Be Made
Public Today, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2007, at C2 (reporting that a U.S. Senate
subcommittee investigating the collapse of a hedge fund recommended that Congress
“reinvigorate prohibitions against excessive speculation”) (internal quotations omitted).
9.
See, e.g., Theresa A. Gabaldon, John Law, with a Tulip, in the South
Seas: Gambling and the Regulation of Euphoric Market Transactions, 26 J. CORP. L.
225 (2001) (advocating the application of approaches from legal restrictions on
gambling to regulation of financial speculation). Roberta Karmel provides a historical
account of how combating excessive speculation was one of the key premises of federal
securities laws. Roberta S. Karmel, Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, Hedge Funds and

Stock Market Volatility—What Regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
Is Appropriate?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 909, 935–37 (2005). Karmel argues that the

SEC and the Federal Reserve had “regulatory tools for pricking” the technology-stock
bubble of the late 1990s, particularly margin regulations, but failed to use these tools or
otherwise address excessive speculation. Id. at 948. Frank Partnoy has addressed the
broader topic of the role law can play in preventing market crashes, including crashes
from speculative bubbles. Frank Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do
About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 741 (2000).
10.
Barboza & Bradsher, supra note 2, at C4.
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action echoed economic scholarship advocating for
transaction taxes to remedy excessive speculation.11
• Economic and legal scholars have long seen arbitrage12 as
a cure for speculative mispricings and as a means to shortcircuit asset-price bubbles.13 Scholars have advocated
enabling arbitrage to perform these roles better by
removing a Depression-era federal securities regulation
that restricted short sales.14 In June 2007, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) repealed this
restriction.15
• Scholars have also characterized “circuit breakers,” which
halt exchange trading after dramatic price declines, as a

11.
See, e.g., Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When
Financial Markets Work Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Transactions Tax,

3 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 261 (1989) (positing that a transaction tax may curb excessive
speculation that results from excess liquidity); Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 281
(advocating increasing short-term–capital-gains tax rates to curb investor gambling);
Joseph E. Stigliz, Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading, 3 J. FIN
SERVS. RES. 101 (1989).
12.
Arbitrage means investment trades that exploit a perceived short-term
mispricing of an asset. For example, if an arbitrageur believes a certain stock is
overvalued, he or she sells that stock short (i.e., borrows shares of that stock and then
sells them). The arbitrageur profits if the stock price declines from the amount owed
the lender of the stock (but loses if the price rises). Arbitrageurs hedge their risks when
entering into short sales by simultaneously buying a close substitute of the stock.
Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35 (1997)
(analyzing how risks cannot be completely removed from arbitrage).
13.
For a survey of the economic literature on the role of arbitrage
(specifically short sales) in preventing asset-price bubbles and promoting the efficient
pricing of stocks and an analysis of the legal restrictions on short sales, see Michael R.
Powers et al., Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance: Tax and Regulatory
Constraints on Short Sales, 57 TAX. L. REV. 233 (2004).
14.
E.g., id. at 264, 270 (advocating repeal of the “uptick rule,” which
permitted short sales on a security only if the previous trade increased the price of that
security). For a comprehensive analysis of the uptick rule, see Jonathan R. Macey et
al., Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick Rule and Its Role in View of
the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799 (1989) (concluding
that the uptick rule impairs market efficiency). The uptick rule is codified at 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10a-1 (2007).
15.
Regulation SHO and Rule 10a-1, 72 Fed. Reg. 36,348 (July 3, 2007) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242). In enacting this rule change, the SEC stated
that the benefits of removing this restriction would include improving the “price
efficiency” of stock markets but did not explicitly reference the role of short sales in
preventing asset-price bubbles. Id. at 36,355. Some scholars have noted that one of the
historical purposes for the now-repealed uptick rule was to prevent bubbles. See
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 226 (2001).
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means of preventing excessive speculation and bubbles.16
Other scholars have advocated reverse circuit breakers,
which would halt trading after precipitous price gains, to
quell excessive speculation.17
• Other scholars and policy makers have seen a role for
enhanced securities-disclosure requirements in mitigating
the risk of asset mispricings due to speculation and
bubbles.18

Whether these legal measures work is open to question. This
Article evaluates the effectiveness of laws, regulations, and policies
designed to prevent asset-price bubbles, to prick bubbles that have
occurred, or to reduce the severity of asset mispricings during
bubbles—what this Article collectively labels “antibubble laws.”
Economists generally define asset-price bubbles as the divergence
of the price of an asset or asset class from its fundamental value,19
16.
See SHILLER, supra note 15, at 225–26. The New York Stock Exchange
initiated a circuit breaker after the 1987 stock-market crash. See NYSE, Inc., Rules and
Constitution, Rule 80B (1998) (“Trading Halts Due to Extraordinary Market
Volatility”). For background on the introduction of this circuit breaker and a proposal
to modify the regulation to take into account how investors experience market time
periods in “nonlinear” ways, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to
Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 598–602 (1994).
17.
Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 283.
18.
In 2003, a member of the Council of Economic Advisors framed a set of
disclosure initiatives by the George W. Bush administration, which included a
requirement that securities issuers provide investors with more quarterly information,
as a means of mitigating the risk of asset-price bubbles and the “likelihood of asset
mispricing.” Randall S. Kroszner, Asset-Price Bubbles, Information, and Public
Policy, in ASSET-PRICE BUBBLES: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY, REGULATORY,
AND INTERNATIONAL POLICIES 3, 10–12 (William C. Hunter et al. eds., 2003). Legal
scholars have seen disclosure as one means to remedy excessive speculation and asset
mispricings. E.g., Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 283–84; Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock
Markets Costly Casinos?: Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81
VA. L. REV. 611, 695–97 (1995) (positing that mandatory-disclosure rules discourage
stock speculation by providing investors with uniform information that encourages
homogeneous expectations).
19.
See, e.g., Robert P. Flood & Peter M. Garber, Market Fundamentals
Versus Price-Level Bubbles: The First Tests, 88 J. POL. ECON. 745, 746 (1980); Henry
T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 777, 794 (2000). At times, economists have expanded this basic definition to
include the reason that asset prices diverge from their fundamental values. Markus K.
Brunnermeier, Bubbles, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven
Durlauf & Lawrence Blume eds., forthcoming 2008) (prepublication edition at 1,
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/bubbles_survey.pdf)
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which is generally defined as the present value of all future cash flows
from an asset.20 This Article considers the effectiveness of laws
designed to combat the speculation that leads to such asset mispricings,
and thus categorizes laws that purport to curb “excessive speculation”
as antibubble laws.21 But these definitions of bubble and fundamental
value give rise to certain deep practical and theoretical problems that
make identifying bubbles in real-world asset markets extremely
difficult.22 Moreover, the complexity of markets makes it difficult to
untangle causal links between policy and effect using empirical
evidence alone.23
Therefore, this Article argues that experimental asset markets
serve as a crucial tool in evaluating the effectiveness of antibubble
laws. These virtual markets allow researchers to create known
fundamental values for securities and to test whether experimental
subjects trade those securities at fundamental value.24 Researchers have,
through experimental controls, introduced market conditions or trading
rules—many of which happen to mimic antibubble laws—to test
whether these controls prevent or mitigate asset mispricings.25
Experimental and empirical evidence suggests that the
effectiveness of antibubble laws in eliminating asset mispricings is
highly questionable. These results, particularly from experimental
evidence, suggest four additional conclusions. First, experimental

(“Bubbles refer to asset prices that exceed an asset’s fundamental value because current
owners believe that they can resell the asset at an even higher price in the future.”).
20.
See, e.g., Ellen R. McGrattan & Edward C. Prescott, Testing for Stock
Market Overvaluation/Undervaluation, in ASSET-PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 18, at 271.
One alternative to defining fundamental value in terms of future cash flows is to say
that the best guess as to fundamental value is whatever the market price is. That
tautology would make it impossible for prices ever to be “wrong.”
21.
Marcel Kahan characterizes these occurrences as “speculative
mispricings.” Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate”
Stock Prices, 41 DUKE L.J. 977, 990–92 (1992). As Kahan explains, stock prices may
diverge from fundamental value for other reasons, such as insider trading and liquidity
crunches. Id. at 988–93. This Article considers only divergences of asset prices from
fundamental values—asset-price bubbles—that result from investor trading behavior.
This Article also considers laws that address “excessive speculation” as antibubble
laws, even if they are less than clear in articulating what constitutes “excessive
speculation” or defining its harms.
22.
Infra Part II.A.1.
23.
See David P. Porter & Vernon L. Smith, Stock Market Bubbles in the
Laboratory, 1 APPLIED MATHEMATICAL FIN. 111, 121–22 (1994).
24.
Ronald R. King et al., The Robustness of Bubbles and Crashes in
Experimental Stock Markets, in NONLINEAR DYNAMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY
ECONOMICS 183, 183–85 (Richard H. Day & Ping Chen eds., 1993).
25.
E.g., id. at 185–86. The design of experimental asset markets is detailed
in Part III.B.2.
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evidence can assist in refining the economic theories on which many
antibubble laws are based.26 Using experiments to refine theory and
shape experimental and empirical investigation represents a more
nuanced approach to scholarship than a simple linear deduction of
policy prescription from theory.
Second, both experimental and empirical evidence on antibubble
laws suggest that asset-price bubbles are remarkably robust.27 Some of
the same evidence of market inefficiencies presented in this Article also
undermines conclusions that legal intervention could remedy these
inefficiencies.28 This highlights a misconception that findings of market
inefficiency, particularly from behavioral finance, necessarily support
market interventions.29
This, in turn, leads to a third conclusion: experimental asset
markets offer an underexploited tool for legal and economic scholars to
evaluate the effectiveness of other securities and financial laws. Just as
laboratory experiments in medicine complement epidemiological
research, so too can experimental-asset-market research provide an
invaluable complement to empirical legal scholarship on financial
regulation.
Although experimental economics is not new to legal scholarship,30
scholars have generally focused on basic economic experiments31 and
have given insufficient attention to more complex simulated financial
markets. For example, path breaking work by 2002 Nobel Laureate
Vernon Smith and other experimental-asset-market researchers has been

26.
See infra Part III.C.1.A.
27.
See infra Part III.C.
28.
See infra Part III.C.
29.
This conclusion is in line with the findings of Stephen Choi and Adam
Pritchard. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2003) (arguing for circumspection in using behavioral law and
economics to justify regulation, as regulators suffer from similar cognitive biases as
investors). Choi and Pritchard note that scholarship reviewing behavioral law and
economics often has political undertones. Id. at 4.
30.
One of the first articles that brought experimental economics to the
attention of legal scholars was Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental
Law and Economics: An Introduction, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 991 (1985).
31.
Legal scholars have focused on the legal implications of relatively simple
experiments such as dictator and ultimatum games. In particular, legal scholars have
looked to these experiments to explain the development of norms of reciprocity. E.g.,
Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996).
Other scholars have looked at the implications of basic experiments for a wide range of
legal fields. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community
Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1513 (2002) (investigating implications of economic
experiments and scholarship on development of social norms for community-policing
efforts).
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underexplored in the legal literature.32 The difficulty of drawing policy
conclusions from experimental asset markets may dissuade scholars.
Indeed, experimental markets can generate conclusions only to the
extent that their simplified attributes reflect the material characteristics
of real markets.33 But this Article attempts to provide a model for
analyzing the validity and results of these experiments.
Finally, since most prophylactic antibubble rules appear
ineffective, legal regimes should instead focus on ensuring the
resiliency of markets to asset-price booms and crashes.34
This Article uses experimental-asset-market research as a tool to
evaluate the effectiveness of laws designed to prevent, prick, or dampen
the severity of asset-price bubbles. The Article creates a typology for
these “antibubble laws” and interprets experimental research in virtual
stock markets to question the effectiveness of these laws in eliminating
asset mispricings during bubbles. This Article argues for greater use of
experimental-asset-market research by legal scholars to evaluate the
effectiveness of other financial regulations and provides a model for
evaluating the validity of results from experimental asset markets.
Part II of this Article surveys the economic literature on asset-price
bubbles. Section A describes several definitions of asset-price bubbles
and highlights the embedded problems in these definitions, particularly
how definitions of fundamental value are weakened by the realities of
asset markets and potential logical circularity.
Section B presents the three principal families of microeconomic
theories of bubbles: “rational bubbles,” “irrational bubbles,” and
bubbles resulting from “heterogeneous expectations.” Because legal
prescriptions are often based on specific economic models, this Article
examines the strengths and weaknesses of both theoretical families,
particularly how problems embedded within the definitions of assetprice bubbles affect the performance of these models. This Section
32.
This Article explores some of the groundbreaking work on asset-price
bubbles in experimental asset markets, one of the key achievements for which Vernon
Smith was awarded a Nobel Prize in 2002. Mike Lynch & Nick Gillespie, The
Experimental Economist, 34 REASON, Dec. 2, 2002, at 34. A handful of legal scholars
have referenced some of this research, usually in footnotes. See, e.g., Thomas A.
Lambert, Overvalued Equity and the Case for an Asymmetric Insider Trading Regime,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045, 1053 n.25 (2006) (noting research on information
efficiency of experimental stock markets); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek,
Virtual Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 169 n.11 (2005)
(same).
33.
Vernon Smith calls this necessary condition for drawing implications from
results of experimental economics “parallelism.” Vernon L. Smith, Microeconomic
Systems as an Experimental Science, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 923, 935–38 (1982)
(outlining “precepts” for design of laboratory experiments in economics).
34.
Infra note 327 and accompanying text.
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focuses on the irrational-bubble theories generated by behavioral
finance as this set of theories, despite the limitations described below,
appears more robust than rational bubbles. Behavioral finance theories
of bubbles also provide a broader template for understanding proposed
and actual antibubble laws.35
Section C then introduces empirical evidence from behavioral
finance of stock-market mispricings and investigates whether this
evidence can be used to develop tests for the existence of bubbles. It
also introduces evidence from experimental economics of the robustness
of bubbles in experimental markets. Section D investigates whether the
logic of behavioral finance applies to real-estate markets given the
unique economic characteristics of real estate. Section E considers
macroeconomic scholarship regarding the role of credit in the formation
of bubbles.
Part III analyzes the effectiveness of laws designed to prevent,
prick, or dampen bubbles. Section A traces how three elements of
behavioral finance theory,36 together with rules based on
macroeconomic evidence regarding the role of credit in bubbles, serve
as a template for understanding both proposed and existing antibubble
laws. This Article creates a new typology for antibubble laws and
categorizes them into four classes according to their method of
addressing bubbles. Antibubble laws are thus designed to fulfill one of
the following objectives:
1. Provide enhanced information to investors on fundamental
value of assets, whereby laws require enhanced disclosure
or investor education that aims to either focus investor
attention on information regarding fundamental value
rather than noise or remedy information asymmetries that
lead to asset mispricing.
2. Short circuit positive-feedback loops, whereby laws attempt
to break or dampen the positive feedback created when

35.
Even policy prescriptions based on other models of bubbles fit roughly
within this template and are evaluated in this Article with distinctions and different
implications from behavioral finance. Behavioral finance scholars have explained
bubble formation as the result of (1) investors trading on “noise” rather than
fundamental information, due to cognitive limitations, mental shortcuts, and behavioral
biases, which (2) lead investors to chase rising asset prices, creating positive-feedback
loops that (3) cannot be corrected by arbitrageurs due to constraints on arbitrage.
ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL FINANCE
1–27 (2000) (providing an overview of behavioral finance theory organized as a
response to the Efficient Market Hypothesis).
36.
See supra note 35.
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investors chase rising asset prices. This category includes
transaction taxes, circuit breakers, and laws that attempt to
either restrict investor access to certain markets or channel
less sophisticated investors to less risky assets.
3. Remove legal restrictions on arbitrage, whereby legal
initiatives would roll back restrictions to enable
arbitrageurs to correct mispricings.
4. Restrict credit to investors to curb speculation, whereby
laws would limit the provision of loans to investors (for
example, margin regulations) or increase the cost of
borrowing.
Section B argues that experimental asset markets are a critical tool
in evaluating the effectiveness of these laws and articulates the general
conditions for drawing conclusions from experimental evidence.
Section C analyzes the experimental and empirical evidence of a range
of antibubble laws following the four-part template outlined above and
makes extensive notes on the limitations of specific pieces of
experimental and empirical evidence.
Part IV moves beyond an analysis of the effectiveness of
antibubble laws to consider their justification and justifiability. Section
A. sketches the potential costs of asset-price bubbles to explain the
reasons why policymakers consider antibubble laws. Recent public
concern over bubbles is justified given the capacity of bubbles and the
collapse of bubbles to cause: widespread misallocation of resources;
reductions in market liquidity; epidemics of financial fraud; crises in
investor confidence; and dramatic economic-spillover effects, including
credit crunches, recession (or worse), and financial contagion into other
markets and countries. Spillover effects go beyond affecting economic
efficiency; collapsing bubbles can create severe inequities and social
dislocation. Because of the potential costs of antibubble laws (outlined
in Part IV.B), they should not be enacted without considering their
effectiveness.
II. ECONOMIC THEORIES OF BUBBLES
Evaluating the effectiveness of laws designed to prevent, prick, or
dampen the magnitude of asset-price bubbles must begin with an
analysis of the economic theories that define bubbles and explain their
formation.
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A. Definitional Problems: Bubbles and Fundamental Value
1.

THE BASIC DEFINITION: PRICE DEVIATION FROM
FUNDAMENTAL VALUE

In the most widespread usage, economists define an asset-price
bubble as a deviation in the price of a certain financial asset (or class of
assets) from its fundamental value.37 The fundamental value, according
to most definitions in the economic literature, represents the present
value of all future cash flows from that asset.38 As an example, the
fundamental value of a bond equals the present value of future
payments of interest and principal on the bond with some discount for
credit risk.39
This tidy example masks practical difficulties and several logical
shortcuts. Two problems stand out. First, economists have calculated
fundamental value for stocks and real estate by estimating future
dividends and rental payments.40 But many companies have adopted
policies of retaining earnings rather than paying dividends,41 and many
real-estate owners cannot rent their property due to legal or practical
restrictions.42 For these assets, the only future cash flow is whatever
37.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text. This definition has several
advantages over a simpler definition used by other historians and economists. See, e.g.,
CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
CRISES 16 (4th ed. 2000) (defining a bubble as “an upward price movement over an
extended range that then implodes”). Although this simpler definition captures the
intuitive shape of a bubble, it fails to single out any causal explanation for the rise and
crash of prices and thus cannot generate any testable hypotheses or predictions.
Defining bubbles as a deviation in asset prices from fundamental value leads to the
question of whether any divergence constitutes a bubble or whether prices must diverge
to a pronounced extent and for a prolonged period.
38.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
39.
For a basic primer on bond valuation, see A. A. GROPPELLI & EHSAN
NIKBAKHT, FINANCE 119–22 (5th ed. 2006).
40.
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Froot & Maurice Obstfeld, Intrinsic Bubbles: The
Case of Stock Prices, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 1189 (1991) (developing a “rational-bubble”
model for stocks using dividend payments as determinant of fundamental value);
Charles Himmelberg et al., Assessing High House Prices: Bubbles, Fundamentals, and
Misperceptions 1–2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11643,
2005) (using the “imputed annual rental cost” of owning property to determine the
presence of a real-estate bubble).
41.
Franklin Allen & Roni Michaely, Payout Policy, in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE
ECONOMICS OF FINANCE, 408 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2003) (describing
the recent historic shift from corporations making payouts to stock investors in
dividends to payouts in share repurchases).
42.
For example, condominium-association governing documents often
prohibit or restrict leasing. See Woodside Village Condominium Ass’n v. Jahren, 806
So. 2d 452, 453 (Fla. 2002) (upholding agreement restricting leases).
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price a buyer will pay on sale, which makes defining fundamental value
not only a speculative endeavor but potentially a circular one as well.43
Second, even measuring fundamental value solely on the basis of
expected dividends or rental payments requires forecasting, and
whether a forecast is reasonable is inescapably subjective. To evaluate
the reasonableness of future-cash-flow estimations, economists resort to
a host of different metrics that usually involve looking at historical
patterns of the relationship between an asset’s price and measures of an
asset’s income (e.g., company earnings).44
But reliance on historical patterns leads to the standard objection of
disclosure boilerplate: past performance does not guarantee future
results.45 In other words, transformational economic changes—the
introduction of a new technology or the opening of a new market—may
create historically aberrant growth.46 These transformational changes
generate fantastic early market returns and lead investors to believe that
historical ratios between an asset’s prices and measures of its income
might be obsolete.47

43.
Logically, the greater the proportion of the income (either expected or
possible) from the sale of an asset to the income from dividend or rental streams, the
more speculative (in every sense of that word) the fundamental value of the asset
becomes (unless the variance in the sales price is less than the variance of dividend and
rental income from the assets).
44.
SHILLER, supra note 15, at 180–83 (investigating the link between stock
dividends, prices, and bubble theories).
45.
SEC regulations require this disclosure on advertising by investment
companies that include performance data. 17 C.F.R. § 230.482(b)(3)(i) (2007).
46.
In fact, many scholars trace the formation of bubbles to widespread
adoption of new technologies (e.g., the first financial exchanges in the seventeenth
century, railroads in the nineteenth century, radios and airplanes in the 1920s, and the
internet in the 1990s), social changes (e.g., the end of wars), or the opening of new
geographical markets. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 37, at 38–41.
47.
These beliefs represent what economist Robert Shiller calls “new era
thinking.” SHILLER, supra note 15, at 96. Many adherents to new era thinking, such as
investors in technology stocks in the late 1990s, could justify their decisions only with
what one economist labels “wildly optimistic expectations of sustained profit growth
rates.” Allan H. Meltzer, Rational and Nonrational Bubbles, in ASSET-PRICE BUBBLES,
supra note 18, at 23, 27–28. But, demarcating when the flavor of reasonable risk taking
becomes the poison of wild optimism is unavoidably subjective. The question of
whether any particular current or historical asset market was in an asset bubble is
beyond the scope of this Article. For an extended argument that the 1990s technology
stock market was a bubble, see William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory
Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843 (2005).
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2.

CONFLATION OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY

When judging whether bubbles have formed with historical
benchmarks, economists essentially use history to turn risk (randomness
with known probabilities) into a proxy for uncertainty (randomness with
unknown probabilities). These economists assume that the fundamental
value of an asset will track certain measures of income from that asset
according to known historical patterns. If prices of an asset diverge
from these historical patterns, one explanation is that a bubble has
formed because investors are miscalculating historical probabilities and
thus miscalculating risk.48 But history is not a certain guide to assetprice movements. Investors looking into the future face unknown
probabilities of gain or loss on their investments; they are not playing
dice.49 Much of the empirical and experimental research that documents
the bounded rationality of investors and underlies behavioral-finance
theories of bubbles50 likewise demonstrates the inability of investors to
calculate and make decisions under known probabilities (i.e., risk)
rather than make inadequate decisions under true uncertainty.
In order to evaluate theories and evidence of bubbles and policies
to prevent, prick, or dampen their magnitude, it is critical to be explicit
when risk is being used as a proxy for uncertainty; to evaluate, if
possible, how well the proxy fits; and to consider how use of this proxy
may affect definitions, tests, and policy prescriptions.
3.

REFINEMENTS: ASSET PRICES AND FUNDAMENTAL INFORMATION

Some economists define a bubble in terms of the information on
which investors trade; bubbles are thus “unsustainable increases” in
asset prices caused by investors trading on a pattern of price increases
rather than information on fundamental values.51 The economists who
use this definition challenge the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH),
which, even in its weak form, holds that investors cannot earn superior
risk-adjusted returns using information the market already knows, such
as the past prices of assets.52
48.
See Meltzer, supra note 47, at 28–29. This distinction between risk and
uncertainty was first made by Frank Knight. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19–20 (1921).
49.
Meltzer, supra note 47, at 28–29.
50.
See infra Part II.B.2.
51.
SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 154.
52.
For an overview of the EMH and the challenge it faces from behavioral
finance, see id. at 5–23. For a seminal work in legal literature on the implications of
this challenge for those securities regulations and doctrines based on the EMH, see
Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market

GERDING - FINAL

12/5/2007 3:16 PM

Laws Against Bubbles

2007:5

991

But the difficulties with defining fundamental value outlined above
also plague efforts to define what constitutes information on
fundamental value. To prove the existence of a bubble under this
definition requires economists to preclude that information relied on by
investors was related to fundamental value.53 As noted below,54
behavioral finance has identified several examples of stock-price
movements that cannot easily be explained by information on
fundamentals.55
4.

DISPUTES ON HISTORICAL BUBBLES

Using any of these definitions, economists have made careers out
of disputing whether or not historical financial manias and crashes
constituted bubbles. Even canonical bubbles, such as the seventeenthcentury Dutch Tulipmania,56 the U.S. stock market circa 1929,57 and
the NASDAQ technology stock bubble in the late 1990s,58 have been

Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992). For the seminal article
introducing the EMH to legal literature, see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman,
The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984).
53.
E.g., Burton G. Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics,
17 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2003, at 59 (questioning whether behavioral finance meets
this standard).
54.
See infra Part II.C.1.
55.
Furthermore, legal scholars have noted that, in its strict sense, the EMH
only contends that market prices reflect all available information regarding an asset and
not that prices necessarily reflect that asset’s fundamental value. See, e.g., Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 766–71 (1985) (drawing a distinction between
arguments that markets are characterized by speculative (i.e., informational) efficiency
and those discussing allocational efficiency). Despite this distinction, the economic
literature on bubbles often appears to conflate informational and allocational efficiency.
See, e.g., Nicholas C. Barberis & Richard H. Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance,
in 1B HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE, supra note 41, at 1054, 1056
(defining “fundamental value” as “the discounted sum of expected future cash flows”
where investors are operating with all available information).
56.
Compare Peter M. Garber, Tulipmania, 97 J. POL. ECON. 535 (1989)
(arguing that prices of tulip bulbs during Dutch tulipomania in 1630s may have been
justified by fundamentals), with EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL SPECULATION 23–26 (1999) (disputing Garber’s facts and
analysis).
57.
Compare McGrattan & Prescott, supra note 20, at 271–75 (presenting
evidence that the 1929 U.S. stock market was not overvalued), with Peter Rappoport &
Eugene N. White, Was There a Bubble in the 1929 Stock Market?, 53 J. ECON. HIST.
549 (1993) (finding evidence that a bubble contributed to the 1920s stock-market boom
and crash despite certain econometric tests that suggest no bubble existed).
58.
Compare Lubos Pastor & Pietro Veronesi, Was There a NASDAQ Bubble
in the Late 1990’s?, 81 J. FIN. ECON 61 (2006) (presenting evidence that there was not
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the subject of contrarian interpretations that market prices during these
financial frenzies were indeed justified by fundamentals.
These debates illuminate the definitional problems outlined above
and tend to break down along the lines of whether economists believe
that investors are rational actors and the EMH holds or whether they
believe that the rationality of investors is bounded and the stock market
is less than efficient. This schism59 has generated two different models
for how bubbles form—rational-bubble models,60 and behavioralfinance models of bubbles.61
This schism also highlights both sides of a logical trap. On the one
side, finding that a bubble existed in the past, only after “future” cash
flows have become historical fact because past prices did not pan out,
creates the risk of hindsight bias.62 On the other side, there is the risk
of tautology. Unless theoretical conditions of irrationality in the
marketplace can be identified, rational expectations and efficient
markets may revert to unfalsifiable articles of faith rather than
hypotheses that can be tested. Claims of market efficiency would also
have to respond to any patterns of asset-price movements that would
violate the keystone of the EMH that asset prices exhibit a random
walk.63

a NASDAQ bubble), with SHILLER, supra note 15, at 3–4 (arguing that the late 1990s
market for technology stocks was overvalued).
59.
See infra Part II.B.2.
60.
See infra Part II.B.1.
61.
See infra Part II.B.2. This Article follows the classification system for
bubble models found in Brunnermeier, supra note 19, at 2.
62.
Scholars often look back and see risk, but investors of the past looked
forward into uncertainty. Robert J. Shiller, Bubbles, Human Judgment, and Expert
Opinion 12–13 (Yale Cowles Found., Discussion Paper No. 1303, 2001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=275515. Only examples of
investor behavior that, at the time, could not be squared with rational expectations or
fundamental information on the value of assets would support findings of investor
irrationality. See Kenneth L. Fisher & Meir Statman, Cognitive Biases in Market
Forecasts, 27 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 72, 78–79 (2000) (evaluating behavioral finance
and other research for hindsight bias in market forecasts). Only comparisons of ultimate
cash flows to historical price changes that show that investors make systematic errors
(under- or overestimating cash flows or under- or overreacting to information) weaken
support for market efficiency. Many behavioral-finance scholars recognize this and
produce evidence of systematic errors. See, e.g., Josef Lakonishok, Contrarian
Investment, Extrapolation and Risk, in II ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 273,
312–13 (Richard H. Thaler ed., 2005) (responding to criticisms of “data snooping”
with evidence of a “systematic pattern of expectational errors” by investors).
63.
In fact, behavioral finance has offered evidence of systematic patterns in
the marketplace that do not accord with a random walk and has identified examples of
market mispricings that indicate investors were not trading on fundamental information.
See infra Part III.C.1.
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B. Microeconomic Models of Bubbles
1.

RATIONAL BUBBLES

Scholars working within neoclassical economics have long
attempted to create models of asset-price bubbles that assume investors
have rational expectations.64 Rational bubbles are generally defined as
self-fulfilling prophecies created by rational expectations of higher
prices.65 Often, rational-bubble models have been used to argue that
asset-price bubbles cannot exist because either investor rationality
would prevent prices from ever departing from fundamentals66 or
bubbles would grow ad infinitum.67
Other scholars have used the circularity in this logic to launch
trenchant critiques of rational-bubble models. These critics claim that
rational-bubble models offer no explanation of how bubbles could ever
begin,68 are extremely unrobust to small changes in model
assumptions,69 and generate mathematically indeterminate solutions.70
Most devastatingly, these scholars argue that rational-bubble theorists
have failed to offer any empirical evidence of rational bubbles
occurring in the real world.71
Some economists have attempted to rectify the first criticism (i.e.,
rational models offer no explanation of how bubbles begin) by tweaking

64.
See, e.g., Oliver Jean Blanchard, Speculative Bubbles, Crashes and
Rational Expectations, 3 ECON. LETTERS 387, 387 (1979).
65.
See Robert P. Flood & Robert J. Hodrick, On Testing for Speculative
Bubbles, 4 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 85, 86.
66.
See, e.g., Jean Tirole, On the Possibility of Speculation Under Rational
Expectations, 50 ECONOMETRICA 1163, 1179–80 (1982). Tirole bases this argument on
the logic of general equilibrium that, if an initial price is efficient and everyone in the
market is informed of that efficiency, no rational buyer would pay more than that price.

Id.

Brunnermeier, supra note 19, at 5.
Meltzer, supra note 47, at 24.
Small changes in the assumptions of the rational-bubble models cause
to generate bubbles. M. C. Adam & A. Szafarz, Speculative Bubbles and
Financial Markets, 44 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 626, 634 (1992).
70.
Equations underlying rational-bubble models have mathematically
indeterminate solutions. Id. at 636. This theoretical indeterminacy, in turn, leads to
inconsistent empirical analysis. One pair of critics notes that “researchers working with
the same data base and identical models will not necessarily detect the ‘same’ bubbles.”
Id. at 638. Moreover, rational-bubble models can generate an infinite number of price
patterns, which bear no resemblance to the intuitive “shapes” of bubbles—either the
prolonged rise in asset prices or the subsequent sharp crash. Id.
71.
Meltzer, supra note 47, at 24.
67.
68.
69.
them to fail
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their models to assume informational asymmetries between investors.72
Essentially, sellers who realize prices may rise above fundamental
values sell to purchasers who lack this information.73 But even
asymmetric rational bubbles have several limiting assumptions, most
notably that arbitrage—and specifically short selling—must face
constraints.74 Even if rational-bubble theories have severe limitations,
they offer one crucial insight that can contribute to more robust models
of bubbles: once a bubble has formed and the expectations of investors
drive asset prices higher, it may be perfectly rational for other investors
to join in bidding prices higher and, in some cases, irrational and costly
not to do so.75
2.

BEHAVIORAL-FINANCE MODELS OF BUBBLES

Behavioral finance picks up on this insight by explaining that
bubbles form because of the herd behavior, or positive-feedback
behavior, of investors. But behavioral finance departs from the view of
neoclassical economic finance that investors are rational actors. Instead,
behavioral finance describes the rationality of investors as “bounded,”
and behavioral-finance models of bubbles argue that it is this departure
from perfect rationality that sparks the initial inflation of a bubble.76
According to the logic of neoclassical finance that undergirds the
EMH,77 the mispricings of a bubble cannot occur for the following
three reasons: (1) investors invest and trade in the capital markets in a
rational manner; (2) any irrational trades are random and cancel each
72.
See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Gary Gorton, Churning Bubbles, 60 REV.
ECON. STUD. 813 (1993).
73.
Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Bubbles and Crises, 110 ECON. J. 236,
236 (2000). Theorists have elaborated on this basic model by explaining how agency
costs contribute to bubble formation. They posit that bubbles form when banks that
cannot perfectly monitor their borrowers’ activities over-lend money to entrepreneurs
who invest in risky assets and are underdeterred by the risk of default because of the
limited liability of the corporate form. Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Asset-Price
Bubbles and Stock Market Interlinkages, in ASSET-PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 18, at
323, 325–29.
74.
Franklin Allen et al., Finite Bubbles with Short Sale Constraints and
Asymmetric Information, 61 J. ECON. THEORY 206 (1993). Asymmetric rational
bubbles also depend on two additional assumptions. First, before a bubble begins an
asset’s price equals its fundamental value, and initial purchasers cannot be aware that
the price equals fundamental value. See Brunnermeier, supra note 19, at 9–10. Second,
for the bubble to persist, this information asymmetry must also persist; subsequent
trading cannot reveal to purchasers that prices have exceeded fundamental value. Allen
et al., supra.
75.
SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 156–68.
76.
See Brunnermeier, supra note 19, at 10.
77.
See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text.
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other out; and (3) arbitrage corrects any remaining irrational trading
not cancelled out.78 Behavioral finance counters each of these
assumptions in turn.

a. Bounded rationality and noise traders
Behavioral finance’s first line of attack on neoclassical finance and
the foundation for its explanation of how asset-price bubbles form is
that many investors do not exhibit perfect rationality in making
investment decisions.79 Behavioral finance argues that many investors
do not: (1) gather optimal information to evaluate the fundamentals of
assets; (2) carefully calculate probabilities and risk; and (3) make
decisions that maximize their self-interest.80 Instead, behavioral finance
argues that many unsophisticated investors trade on “noise”—
information not related to assessing the fundamental value of assets.81
These “noise traders” evaluate whether to buy or sell assets based on
price trends,82 emotions,83 or estimations about what other investors in
the market will do.84
Unsophisticated investors trade on noise, according to behavioral
finance, because their decision making is marred by behavioral biases.85
Behavioral finance draws on extensive experimental literature from the
fields of social psychology and the cognitive sciences, now well
explored by the legal academy, 86 that shows individuals use mental

78.
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 52, at 579–88.
79.
SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 10–12 (summarizing principle behavioral
finance research that investors are not “fully rational”); Barberis & Thaler, supra note
55, at 1065–69.
80.
Barberis & Thaler, supra note 55, at 1065–74.
See Donald C. Langevoort, Taming the Animal Spirits of the Stock
81.
Markets: A Behavioral Approach to Securities Regulation, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 135,
139–52 (2002) (surveying noise-trader research in economic literature).
82.
Robert J. Shiller, Stock Prices and Social Dynamics, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS
ECON. ACTIVITY 457 (1984).
83.
For an analysis of how emotions affect the decisions of investors, see
Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance and Anxiety in Securities Markets,
in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 501, 505–18 (Francesco Parisi
& Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005).
84.
See generally Robert J. Shiller, Fashions, Fads, and Bubbles in Financial
Markets, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS AND TARGETS 56 (John C. Coffee, Jr. et al. eds., 1988).
85.
Behavioral finance builds off evidence that individuals often exhibit
preferences that skew how investors evaluate risky gambles. Barberis & Thaler, supra
note 55, at 1069–75.
86.
For an introduction to the now-extensive literature on behavioral law and
economics, see Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). For a discussion of behavioral biases leading to the
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shortcuts, called “heuristics,” to process information and make
complex economic decisions.87 These heuristics lead to systematic
behavioral biases in the perception of risk, including overoptimism,88
overconfidence,89 and the availability bias.90 According to behavioral
finance scholarship, during an extended market boom with conspicuous
gains by early investors, these biases and other biases cause investors to
conclude that rising prices will continue.91 Moreover, investors
conclude that they will profit handsomely from flipping assets and that
they will be able to sell before a price downturn due to superior skill.92

b. Herding and positive-feedback investment loops
Second, behavioral finance presents evidence that refutes the
second contention of neoclassical scholars. Instead of canceling each
other out, noise traders reinforce each other because bounded
rationality and behavioral biases cause highly correlated and mutually
reinforcing—rather than random—investment decisions.93 Behavioral
finance presents evidence that investors are influenced by social
formation of stock-market bubbles, see Werner De Bondt, Bubble Psychology, in
ASSET-PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 18, at 205, 210–12.
87.
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974).
88.
Overoptimism in the context of investing describes how noise traders
possess an overly optimistic view of their good fortune in a stock market. See, e.g., J.
Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer, The Stock Market Bubble of 1929: Evidence
from Closed-end Mutual Funds, 51 J. ECON. HIST. 675, 697 (1991) (concluding that
over-optimism of investors contributed to the 1929 stock-market bubble).
89.
Overconfidence in the context of investing describes how noise traders
overestimate their own ability to predict stock-market fluctuations and time their exit
before a crash. See J. Bradford De Long et al., The Survival of Noise Traders in
Financial Markets, 64 J. BUS. 1, 5 (1991) (arguing that the overconfidence bias leads
noise traders to remain in the market despite a risk of severe losses). Behavioral
economists have presented substantial empirical evidence that individuals exhibit
overoptimism in judging the probability of good outcomes and are overconfident in
their own abilities, including their ability to estimate probabilities. See Barberis &
Thaler, supra note 55, at 1065–66.
90.
The availability bias describes how more recent or salient events tend to
overinfluence an individual’s estimates of probabilities. See Tversky & Kahneman,
supra note 87, at 1127–28.
91.
Conversely, the remoteness of the last crash or market downturn causes
investors to discount the possibility of incurring heavy losses. Richard J. Herring &
Susan Wachter, Real Estate Booms and Banking Busts: An International Perspective
99–127 (The Wharton Fin. Insts. Ctr., Working Paper, 1999) (on file with author); see
also J. Bradford De Long et al., Positive Feedback Investment Strategies and
Destabilizing Rational Speculation, 45 J. FIN. 379, 383 (1990) (questioning why noise
traders do not learn from previous bubbles).
92.
See De Bondt, supra note 86, at 208–09.
93.
See SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 11–12.
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dynamics and thus engage in herd behavior, follow fads, and chase
trends.94
Behavioral finance places this behavior in a larger rubric of
“positive-feedback investment strategies.”95 If prices of an asset rise,
investors who pursue these strategies bid prices higher as they base
their analysis on the asset-price trend.96 The resulting rise in prices
further increases demand among these noise traders, and a feedback
loop develops.97

c. Limited arbitrage
Betting against noise traders in the middle of a positive-feedback
loop can prove perilous. This points to the third response of behavioral
finance to neoclassical economics: arbitrage may not correct deviations
from fundamental value because arbitrageurs face severe limitations in
attempting to exploit the mispricings caused by noise traders.98 Many
legal and economic scholars focus on legal limitations on arbitrage,
notably short-sale restrictions.99
But arbitrageurs also face various forms of economic risks. First,
arbitrageurs face a “fundamental risk,” which is the risk that future
news about a company may drive the prices against the arbitrageur’s
position.100 Second, arbitrageurs face “noise-trader risk,” which is the
risk that noise traders will drive the prices further away from
fundamental values.101 This risk becomes pronounced if a period of

94.
Id. at 12. See SHILLER, supra note 15, at 135–68 (outlining the
psychological basis for investment decisions and the effect of herd behavior on capital
markets); Shiller, supra note 82, at 457 (arguing that investors make decisions because
of social and behavioral factors rather than through rational, self-interested
calculations).
95.
See SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 154–55.
96.
Id. at 155–56. Again, economists consider price-trend-information noise
rather than information about the fundamental value of the asset.
97.
For a model of this feedback loop, see id. at 158–68.
98.
See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 55, at 1058–59.
99.
See, e.g., Powers et al., supra note 13.
100. See Barberis & Thaler, supra note 55, at 1058–59. Hedging by buying or
selling substitute stocks cannot completely remove this risk given the rarity of perfect
substitutes. Id.; SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 14. In addition, substitute stocks may
themselves be mispriced, which is more likely in periods of systematic mispricing, such
as bubbles. Barberis & Thaler, supra note 55, at 1058 n.4. No substitutes exist for
stocks or bonds as a whole, making arbitrage against market-wide mispricing
impossible. SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 13. Andrei Shleifer describes the huge losses
that would have threatened an arbitrageur attempting to sell short during the apparent
stock-market-wide overvaluation of the late 1990s. Id. at 15–16.
101. J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98
J. POL. ECON. 703, 705 (1990).
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prolonged investor irrationality begins.102 Arbitrageurs who aim to
exploit (and thus correct) mispricings may be unable to outlast noise
traders.103 Noise trading could be countered by the combined
resources of several arbitrageurs, but arbitrageurs face a final risk—
collective-action failure.104
In contrast to neoclassical theory, arbitrageurs with superior
information may have a strong incentive to trade ahead of, not against,
noise traders.105 Arbitrageurs who adopt this strategy can reap
enormous profits and then liquidate their positions before noise traders
reverse course. Strong empirical evidence indicates that arbitrageurs in
fact behave in this manner, exacerbating the severity of mispricing
caused by noise trading.106

102. See SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 15–16 (describing the noise-trader risk
faced by arbitrageurs attacking apparent overvaluation during the technology bubble).
103. Arbitrageurs enjoy neither unlimited resources nor infinite time horizons.
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 12, at 38–43. Most arbitrageurs have short horizons
because they are managing the money of other investors; this creates a classic agency
problem. If an arbitrageur loses considerable money in the short-run trading against
noise, investors and creditors may view this as a sign of the arbitrageur’s
incompetence and threaten to withdraw funds or loans, forcing the arbitrageur to
liquidate positions prematurely. Id. Arbitrageurs may be unable to outlast noise
traders; economists have shown that, contrary to the assumptions of the EMH, noise
traders can persist in financial markets for extended periods. See generally De Long
& Shleifer, supra note 88 (arguing that the overconfidence bias leads noise traders to
remain in the market despite a risk of severe losses). The risks arbitrageurs face in
betting against irrational investors are not just theoretical. The Tiger Fund—perhaps
the most prominent fund that refused to bet against technology stocks in the late
1990s by refusing to invest in them—suffered heavy losses and was forced to close in
March 2000, mere months before the peak of the NASDAQ. Markus K.
Brunnermeier & Stefan Nagel, Hedge Funds and the Technology Bubble, 59 J. FIN.
2013, 2030–32 (2004). Furthermore, even if a market crash wipes out noise traders,
a new generation of noise traders could enter the market in time for a new bubble.
This real possibility counters the argument of some proponents of the EMH that the
bursting of one bubble precludes future episodes of irrationality. See Lynn A. Stout,
The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J.
CORP. L. 635, 666 (2003).
104. Other arbitrageurs may not similarly trade against noise because of
different information. See Dilip Abreu & Markus K. Brunnermeier, Synchronization
Risk and Delayed Arbitrage, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 341, 343 (2002) (labeling this risk of
collective action failure as “synchronization risk”). Coordinated action is limited by
the threat of defection and legal constraints. See id.
105. SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 169, 172.
106. See Brunnermeier & Nagel, supra note 103, at 2014–16.
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d. A behavioral-finance model of asset-price bubbles
One behavioral-finance scholar connects these elements of
behavioral finance in a simple model of how bubbles form.107 First, a
“displacement”—either an external macroeconomic or political event or
good news about a specific industry—causes corporate profits to rise.
Investors with superior information make conspicuous gains as share
prices rise. Noise traders, attracted by rising prices, enter the market and
bid prices even higher, adopting positive-feedback investment strategies.
Informed investors and arbitrageurs (known as “smart money”)
anticipate noise-trader demand and bid-up prices in advance of noise
traders, further stimulating demand. When smart money senses the
market overheating, it sells. Ultimately, noise traders follow and, once a
tipping point is reached, prices crash.108
3.

HETEROGENEOUS-EXPECTATIONS MODELS OF BUBBLES

A number of economists have created a third set of theories for
how bubbles develop that resembles, in certain respects, the work of
behavioral finance. This third set of models posits that bubbles form
due to the fact that investors have heterogeneous beliefs about the
future market prices compared to the homogenous beliefs assumed by
neoclassical economics.109 Under many of the models in this third
family, the divergence of investor beliefs stems from psychological
biases, but all of these models include limitations on short selling.110
Heterogeneity of investor beliefs or expectations can lead to price
inflation as optimistic investors bid prices up while more pessimistic
investors cannot sell short because of arbitrage limitations.111

C. Evidence of Mispricings
1.

EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF ANOMALIES AND TESTS FOR BUBBLES

Behavioral-finance scholars back up their theoretical challenge to
neoclassical finance and the EMH with empirical evidence of stockmarket mispricings, that is, examples of various pricing anomalies in
capital markets that violate the tenets of investor rationality and the

107. SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 169–75.
108. Id. at 169–75.
109. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 755–
62 (1999) (describing this set of models).
110. Brunnermeier, Bubbles, supra note 19.
111. Id.
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EMH.112 Phenomena, such as the closed-end fund puzzle,113 the twinshare anomaly,114 the IPO carve out,115 and Internet-name anomalies,116
represent instances in which either certain stock prices could not have
reflected fundamental value or investors could not have been trading on
fundamental information. Economists consider these anomalies
evidence of “investor sentiment.”117
These anomalies may serve as indicia of the existence of stockmarket bubbles and add to the set of imperfect tools for detecting
bubbles.118 But serious questions remain as to whether anomalies
indicate broader market mispricings or are merely isolated
curiosities.119 Phrased differently, does evidence of investor sentiment
equate with evidence of asset-price bubbles?120 Economists are working
to develop other tools for detecting bubbles, such as investor surveys,121
but evidence from anomalies and other tools often points in contrary
112. Barberis & Thaler, supra note 55, at 1061–64; SHILLER, supra note 15, at
179–80.
113. The prices of certain mutual funds have occasionally risen far above the
net asset value of the fund, even after adjusting for tax and other considerations. This
means that investors are paying more for shares in a fund than they would pay if they
purchased the proportionate share of the stocks in that fund’s portfolio. See De Long &
Shleifer, supra note 88, at 697 (recognizing that this phenomenon existed in the late
1920s).
114. This anomaly occurs when a given security is traded on two different
markets, but the prices in those markets diverge over an extended period of time. See
Barberis & Thaler, supra note 55, at 1061–63 (explaining the twin-share anomaly and
noting how arbitrageurs theoretically could exploit it).
115. After 3Com sold five percent of its shares of Palm in an initial public
offering, Palm’s stock price paradoxically rose above the implicit price of its parent,
3Com. This implied that, apart from its shareholdings in Palm, 3Com had a negative
value. Owen A. Lamont & Richard H. Thaler, Can the Market Add and Subtract?:
Mispricing in Tech Stock Carve-Outs, 111 J. POL. ECON. 227, 230–31 (2003)
(documenting multiple examples of this anomaly).
116. During the recent technology-stock boom, researchers noted that shares of
companies with “.com” in their name sold in public offerings for significantly higher
prices statistically than those of comparable companies. Also, market news about
certain companies would irrationally affect the prices of different companies with
similar names or stock-market-ticker symbols. Yaron Brooks & Robert J. Hendershott,
Hype and Internet Stocks, J. INVESTING, Summer 2001, at 53; Michael J. Cooper et al.,
A Rose.com by Any Other Name, 56 J. FIN. 2371, 2371–72 (2001).
117. Malcolm Baker & Jeffrey Wurgler, Investor Sentiment in the Stock
Market, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2007, at 129, 129 (defining sentiment as “belief about
future cash flows and investment risks that is not justified by the facts at hand”).
118. See Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral
Finance, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2003, at 83, 101–02.
119. See, e.g., Malkiel, supra note 53.
120. E.g., id.
121. See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, Measuring Bubble Expectations and Investor
Confidence (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7008, 1999).
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directions. Identifying historical bubbles, let alone determining whether
markets are currently experiencing a bubble, remains more art than
science.
2.

CRITICISM OF BEHAVIORAL FINANCE: OPEN QUESTIONS

Critics of behavioral finance charge that behavioral finance offers
a laundry list of cognitive biases but does not adequately specify the
particular biases (or the relative role among biases) that lead to
mispricings and bubbles.122 Other scholars note that certain behavioral
biases, such as the hot-hand123 and gambler’s124 fallacies, run counter to
one another.125 Other biases, such as conservatism,126 would work
against positive-feedback loops by causing investors to discount recent
price trends and overemphasize long-term price probabilities.
Moreover, behavioral finance has yet to fully flesh out an
explanation of seller behavior during the rise of a bubble.127 At least

122. Robert S. Chirinko, Comments on: “Stocks as Money …” and “Bubble
Psychology,” in ASSET-PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 18, at 231, 234–35 (“While reading
the behavioral finance literature, one gets the feeling of being in a well-stocked
supermarket with a multitude of psychological tendencies waiting to be plucked from
the shelf to explain the NASDAQ decline and other financial market outcomes. . . .
With a surplus of explanations, it is difficult to know how to evaluate and discriminate
among behavioral theories.”).
123. The hot-hand fallacy translates a phenomenon from the sports world
where coaches and athletes believe that an individual’s shooting streak will continue,
despite the statistical evidence that the shooter is enjoying a streak of luck and his or
her performance will revert to its long-term mean. Thomas Gilovich et al., The HotHand in Basketball: On the Misperception of Random Sequences, 17 COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 295 (1985). The hot-hand fallacy could lead to investors bidding up assets
based on the erroneous belief that rising prices indicate a streak of their personal
investing skill rather than chance or the development of a positive-feedback loop.
124. This fallacy refers to a common mistake that one random event can affect
or be used to predict another random event. The canonical example is the erroneous
belief that if a coin is flipped four times and lands “heads” each of those times, it has a
greater than fifty percent probability of landing “tails” on the next flip. Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahnemann, Belief in the Law of Small Numbers, 76 PSYCHOL. BULL. 105,
106 (1971). In asset prices, the gambler’s fallacy might lead an investor to conclude
that a lucky streak of rising prices is about to end and cause him or her to sell, thus
short-circuiting a positive-feedback loop.
125. Gregory La Blanc & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, In Praise of Investor
Irrationality, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 83, at
542, 556.
126. Conservatism describes mistakes in calculating probability due to the
overweighting of base-rate probabilities and the underweighting of sample probabilities.
Ward Edwards, Conservatism in Human Information Processing, in FORMAL
REPRESENTATION OF HUMAN JUDGMENT 17, 17–18 (Benjamin Kleinmutz ed., 1968).
127. See Meltzer, supra note 47, at 28.
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two explanations are possible. The first is a model with two groups—
noise traders that buy and smart money that sells.128 The second
explanation involves noise traders rapidly flipping stocks among each
other, with each trader overconfident that he or she knows better than
his or her counterpart when a stock is under- or overvalued.129
These critiques of behavioral finance indicate open research
questions, including the need to articulate which behavioral biases cause
investor sentiment and asset mispricings, which types of investors
suffer from which biases and to what degree, and when certain biases
come to dominate opposing biases.130
3.

ROBUSTNESS OF BUBBLES IN EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKETS

Although behavioral finance’s theory and evidence of asset-price
bubbles has been criticized, experimental economics offers supporting
evidence by documenting the existence of asset-price bubbles in
experimental asset markets.131 These experimental markets buttress
much of the theoretical and empirical work of behavioral finance by
demonstrating how even relatively financially sophisticated investors
can behave like noise traders in simulated stock markets.132
128. See, e.g., SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 169–74; Weihong Huang & Richard
H. Day, Chaotically Switching Bear and Bull Markets: The Derivation of Stock Market
Distributions from Behavioral Rules, in NONLINEAR DYNAMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY
ECONOMICS, supra note 24, at 169, 169–81 (modeling stock-market cycles as nonlinear
results of the interaction of noise traders, investors trading on fundamental information,
and market makers). This explanation would benefit greatly from further precision
regarding the profiles of the investors who fall in each category and from an
investigation into whether stocks become increasingly concentrated in the hands of
noise traders. See Meltzer, supra note 47, at 26–28 (critiquing irrational-bubble models
for failing to answer these questions).
129. In both explanations, further research is required to understand the
mechanics of the tipping point between bubble and crash.
130. Gregory Mitchell argues that behavioral-law-and-economics scholarship
has been impeded by its focus on “behavioral tendencies” and its failure to articulate
the “boundary conditions” for those tendencies. Gregory Mitchell, Tendencies versus
Boundaries: Levels of Generality in Behavioral Law and Economics, 56 VAND. L. REV.
1781 (2003). The difficulty in linking behavioral biases to mispricings (a “bottom-up
approach”) has led other economists to take a “top-down approach” and use clear
statistical evidence of investor sentiment to identify types of securities more likely to
suffer from sentiment. See, e.g., Baker & Wurgler, supra note 117, at 130.
131. See, e.g., Gunduz Caginalp et al., Overreactions, Momentum, Liquidity,
and Price Bubbles in Laboratory and Field Asset Markets, 1 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN.
MARKETS 24 (2000); King et al., supra note 24, at 183; Porter & Smith, supra note 23,
at 111; Vernon L. Smith et al., Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in
Experimental Spot Asset Markets, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1119 (1988).
132. E.g., Caginalp et al., supra note 131 (using experimental-asset-market
results to create a “momentum model” explaining trader behavior).
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Experimental economists have conducted sets of experiments in
which subjects trade a fixed-income security with each other on a
computer trading system over a set number of trading periods.133 In
these experiments, traders knew that the security would mature at the
end of the last trading period and were informed of the probabilities
that a fixed dividend would be paid at the end of every trading period.
This means that there was a true fundamental value to the security (i.e.,
no Knightian uncertainty)134 and that traders could calculate this value
as of each trading period.135 Yet traders repeatedly engaged in bidding
wars that drove the prices of securities higher than fundamental values,
with prices returning to fundamental value, often via crash, only in the
last trading period.136 Bubbles in these experimental markets have
proven remarkably robust under various conditions.137

D. Real-Estate Bubbles
Much of behavioral-finance literature has focused on stock-market
bubbles, which leads to the question of whether the same logic of
irrational investors driving market mispricing applies to other asset
classes, particularly real estate. Real-estate assets possess economic
characteristics such as immobility,138 durability,139 heterogeneity,140 and

133. See, e.g., Caginalp et al., supra note 131, at 24; King et al., supra note
24, at 183; Porter & Smith, supra note 23, at 111; Smith et al., supra note 131, at 56.
134. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
135. See Caginalp et al., supra note 131, at 24–25; David P. Porter & Vernon
L. Smith, Futures Contracting and Dividend Uncertainty in Experimental Asset
Markets, 68 J. BUS. 509, 509–10 (1995); Smith et al., supra note 131, at 1124.
136. Caginalp et al., supra note 131, at 26; King et al., supra note 24, at 199–
200; Porter & Smith, supra note 23, at 121–22; Smith et al., supra note 131, at 1148–
50.
137. See Caginalp et al., supra note 131, at 26–32 (surveying experiments
where bubbles occurred despite various changes in experimental market conditions).
For samples of experiments testing for the occurrence of bubbles under various
economic conditions and policies, see King et al., supra note 24, at 185–200; Vivian
Lei et al., Non-speculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common
Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality, 69 ECONOMETRICA 831 (2001);
Smith et al., supra note 131.
138. Real estate, by definition, cannot be moved from one location to another,
which, in turn, influences the other economic properties of real estate discussed in this
Section. MICHAEL BALL ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF COMMERCIAL PROPERTY MARKETS
273 (1998) (“Partly because the investment is heterogeneous and immobile, no central
trading market, equivalent to the stock market, has developed for property.”).
139. Securities and the companies that issue them can terminate, but, barring
cataclysm, land cannot be destroyed and buildings tend to have long lives. THOMAS W.
SHAFER, REAL ESTATE AND ECONOMICS 29–30 (1975) (“The possibility of the market
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consumability141 that differ materially from securities. Because of these
factors, real-estate assets are not fungible and real-estate markets are
both fragmented—there are no central national markets for trading realestate properties as there are for securities142—and prone to periods of
disequilibrium.143
The factors promoting disequilibrium can be exacerbated by the
same behavioral phenomena described in behavioral-finance theory.
Although the connections to behavioral-finance theory remain
underexplored, real-estate economists have begun to map out how
heuristics, behavioral biases, herd behavior, and positive-feedback
loops can drive mispricing in real-estate markets.144 Moreover,

making necessary adjustments in the short run to take advantage of temporary and
short-lived demand is reduced by the long life of real estate assets.”).
140. The uniqueness of each piece of real estate generates information costs for
purchasers, complicates pricing, and limits the availability of substitutes. BALL ET AL.,
supra note 138, at 273.
141. Real estate represents not only an investment good that can be leased or
sold for a return, but also a consumption good used for work or living space; and
investors often purchase a real-estate asset for both investment and consumption
functions. Id. at 14.
142. See supra note 138.
143. Immobility means that supply of real estate in one physical location cannot
be moved to meet greater demand in another area; people and businesses must move to
real estate, which involves high transaction costs. See SHAFER, supra note 139, at 29–
30. Durability means that the stock of housing cannot contract easily in periods of
lower demand, creating the potential for gluts. See id. at 29. Heterogeneity contributes
to higher information costs and information asymmetries. See BALL ET AL., supra note
138, at 273–74. Heterogeneity also makes hedging difficult by limiting the availability
of close substitutes and increasing the transaction costs of purchasing real estate. Id. at
273. The high transaction costs of purchasing and selling real estate slow market
corrections. In turn, the high costs of development delays the entry of new real-estate
stock to meet demand. Id. at 15. Finally, the dual use of real estate for investment and
consumption often leads individuals to “overinvest” in real estate by investing more
money in a particular asset than can be recouped when selling the asset in the market.
See Jan K. Brueckner, Consumption and Investment Motives and the Portfolio Choices
of Homeowners, 15 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 159 (1997) (evaluating evidence of
overinvestment due to the consumption value of real estate).
144. E.g., Markus K. Brunnermeier & Christian Julliard, Money Illusion and
Housing Frenzies, REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/~markus/research/papers/money_illusion_housing_frenzies.
pdf; Robert J. Shiller, Historic Turning Points in Real Estate (Crowles Found.,
Discussion Paper No. 1610, 2007), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d16a/
d1610.pdf); Grace Wong, The Anatomy of a Housing Bubble: Overconfidence, Media
and Politics (Feb. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://
real.wharton.upenn.edu/~wongg/research/bubble.pdf).
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empirical research indicates that the EMH does not apply to real-estate
markets.145
The unique properties of real-estate markets may worsen
mispricings. For example, because real estate is not a common-value
good and is not traded on a market, it is impossible to short sell
individual real-estate properties, which means arbitrage cannot correct
mispricings.146 In addition, because of their unique economic
characteristics, real-estate prices also exhibit rigidity or inflexibility
(“stickiness”), particularly downward stickiness.147 Downward
stickiness has led some economists to analyze whether crashes may be
delayed or whether certain real-estate bubbles do not crash but persist
or slowly leak.148

E. Macroeconomic Research into the Role of Credit in Bubbles
Both the rational- and behavioral-finance models of bubbles are
constructs of microeconomics. But there is also a long history of
macroeconomic scholarship regarding bubbles that focuses on the role
of credit in driving mispricings. This line of inquiry must be considered
as either an alternative or a complement to microeconomic models.
Otherwise, antibubble laws may miss important factors in bubble
formation and target the wrong causes. In particular, macroeconomists
have studied the effects of monetary policy and have noted a pattern
that increasing interest rates have pricked asset-price bubbles, leading
to price downturns.149 Even macroeconomists who disagree about the
wisdom of using monetary policy to control asset prices150 agree that

145. Man Cho, House Price Dynamics: A Survey of Theoretical and Empirical
Issues, 7 J. HOUSING RES. 145 (1996); Dean H. Gatzlaff & Doğan Tirtiroğlu, Real
Estate Market Efficiency: Issues and Evidence, 3 J. REAL EST. LITERATURE 157 (1995).
146. But, due to the innovations of economists, it is also now possible to invest
in real-estate futures contracts sold on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. These futures
contracts allow property owners and investors to hedge against potential increases or
decreases in property values in various regional markets. Economists also believe that
by providing information to investors on expectations of long-run price trends these
futures may also signal when real estate is overpriced and thus deter the formation of
bubbles. Noam Scheiber, The Pork-Bellies Approach to Housing, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Sep. 10, 2006, at 90.
147. Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, The Behavior of Home Buyers in Boom
and Post-Boom Markets, NEW ENG. ECON. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1988, at 29, 44–45.
148. Karl E. Case & Robert J. Shiller, Is There a Bubble in the Housing
Market?, 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 299 (2003).
149. See SHILLER supra note 15, at 222–23.
150. See infra notes 296–97 and accompanying text.
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raising interest rates in many cases could have the effect of pricking a
bubble.151
The power of interest-rate increases to prick asset-price bubbles
suggests that interest rates and the availability of credit might help
explain the formation of bubbles, but this possible connection remains
underexplored in the economic literature.152 But for purposes solely of
evaluating the effectiveness of antibubble laws, theory may not be
essential, as macroeconomic evidence that interest rates can prick assetprice increases provides a shortcut.
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ANTIBUBBLE LAWS
Economic theories of bubble formation are important not least
because policymakers, legal scholars, and economists have used them
to craft laws and policies to prevent asset-price bubbles, prick bubbles

151. Compare Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Should Central Banks
Respond to Movements in Asset Prices, AM. ECON. REV., May 2001, at 253 (arguing
that monetary policy should not be used to prick asset-price bubbles), with Stephen G.
Cecchetti et al., Asset Prices in a Flexible Inflation Targeting Framework, in ASSETPRICE BUBBLES, supra note 18, at 427, 438–41 (arguing that monetary policy can and
should respond to “asset price misalignments”).
152. One controversial exception is the theory that asset-price bubbles might be
spurred by investor anticipation of fluctuations in interest rates due to inconsistent and
changing monetary policy (labeled “process switching”). Robert P. Flood & Robert J.
Hodrick, Asset Price Volatility, Bubbles and Process Switching, in SPECULATIVE
BUBBLES, SPECULATIVE ATTACKS, AND POLICY SWITCHING 135, 136 (Robert P. Flood &
Peter M. Garber eds., 1994). In many macroeconomic models that examine the effects
of interest rates on asset-price bubbles, asset-price bubbles are exogenous and their
formation need not be explained. See, e.g., Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Monetary
Policy and Asset Price Volatility 7, 15–25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7559, 2000).
Several theories may explain the link between interest rates and bubbles. First,
lower interest rates may fuel speculation through provision of cheap credit to investors
purchasing assets, and rising interest rates make borrowing these funds too expensive.
See Stephen Malpezzi & Susan M. Wachter, The Role of Speculation in Real Estate
Cycles, 13 J. REAL EST. LITERATURE 143 (2005).
But this theory is problematic, as lower costs of borrowing could stimulate
investing in assets without necessarily causing prices to deviate from fundamental
value. This necessitates consideration of alternative theories. A second theory is that
lower interest rates may cause investors to suffer from “money illusion,” or the
mistaken belief that assets purchased with credit are cheaper in real terms. See
Brunnermeier & Julliard, supra note 144, at 1–3; Eldar Shafir et al., Money Illusion,
112 Q. J. ECON. 341 (1997). The first and second theories can be synthesized into a
third theory. Even if lower costs of borrowing stimulate asset prices without deviating
from fundamental value, the price boom may encourage noise traders to chase a price
trend, perhaps in the mistaken belief that the boom stems from a transformational
change in fundamental value.
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that have formed, or dampen the severity of asset mispricings during
bubbles.

A. Proposed and Current Antibubble Laws
This Section outlines how policymakers and scholars have inferred
policy conclusions from those economic theories outlined in Part II to
craft antibubble laws. This Article creates a new typology for proposed
and current antibubble laws with the following four categories: (1) laws
that provide investors with higher-quality information about
fundamental values of assets; (2) laws that attempt to short-circuit
positive-feedback investment strategies; (3) laws that aim to enable
arbitrage; and (4) laws that aim to restrict credit to investors to dampen
“excessive” speculation.
1.

IMPROVING INFORMATION TO INVESTORS AND INFORMATION
PROCESSING OF INVESTORS

Some scholars have posited that the development of asset-price
bubbles or excessive speculation can be hindered by providing investors
with higher-quality information on fundamental values or improving
their ability to process fundamental information.153 Other behavioral
finance scholars argue that with clearer information on fundamentals,
investors will focus less on noise, such as price trends.154 Scholars who
follow rational-bubble models have also advocated enhanced securities
disclosure to remedy information asymmetries that can cause bubbles.
For example, Randall Krozner, then a member of the Council of
Economic Advisors, framed the George W. Bush administration’s 2002

153. Some scholars who have advocated disclosure as an antidote for bubbles
subscribe to the theory that bubbles stem from the heterogeneous expectations of
investors; disclosure could mitigate the incidence and severity of bubbles by
encouraging investors to form common expectations of future asset prices. Gabaldon,
supra note 9, at 283–84; Stout, supra note 18, at 695–97. By contrast, a few scholars
have recommended tailoring securities-disclosure requirements to take into account
behavioral and emotional responses to information by investors. See, e.g., Huang,
supra note 83, at 518–22.
154. Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Why Should Disclosure Rules Subsidize
Informed Traders, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 417, 424 (1996) (arguing that disclosure
may cause noise traders to reconsider beliefs). Some scholars take an alternative
approach and argue that disclosure reduces the effect of noise traders by increasing the
number and influence of “informational traders.” Id.; Zohar Goshen & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 739
(2006). Other scholars have used the findings of behavioral finance to argue that
mandatory disclosure promotes noise trading. E.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Is There a Cure
for “Excessive” Trading?, 81 VA. L. REV. 713, 743 (1995).
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ten-point securities-disclosure initiative as a means of reducing the
likelihood of asset mispricing and bubbles.155
Mirroring disclosure recommendations, scholars recommend
investor-education programs—including government-sponsored or
government-mandated programs—to mitigate the risk of speculative
excess.156 Some economists advocate creating new futures markets to
provide clearer signals to investors when short-time price increases
appear unsustainable.157
But, with the exception of creating futures markets, these
proposals for enhanced securities-law-disclosure regulations and
investor education are somewhat inchoate; it is unclear what these
proposals would concretely add to existing federal securities-lawdisclosure requirements. Formulating more concrete disclosure
proposals (or investor-education programs) recalls the central problems
in defining what constitutes fundamental value. Indeed, a great deal of
information may shed light on an asset’s future income potential, but
what information would cut through noise and be most salient for
investors remains an open question.
2.

SHORT CIRCUITING POSITIVE-FEEDBACK INVESTMENT LOOPS

Even if a large group of investors persist in trading on noise, some
economists and legal scholars advocate policies to break down the
positive-feedback loops caused by these investors. These policies can
take several forms. First, several scholars have argued that, if noise
traders create a severe risk of widespread mispricing of assets, then the
government should restrict their access to markets or channel their
investments to less risky assets.158 In a sense, these proposals turn the

155. Kroszner, supra note 18, at 8–12. In this same article, Kroszner also
argues that Bush administration proposals to alter the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act would serve these same goals by giving employers greater flexibility to
sponsor investment advice for employees and clarifying the employer’s legal liability in
doing so. Id. at 8–10.
156. De Bondt, supra note 86, at 212; Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 280–83; cf.
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Behavioral Finance and Investor Governance, 59 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 767, 788–96 (2002) (proposing investor-education programs to remedy
investor behavioral biases).
157. ROBERT J. SHILLER, MACRO MARKETS: CREATING INSTITUTIONS FOR
MANAGING SOCIETY’S LARGEST ECONOMIC RISKS 204–05 (1993).
158. Stephen Choi has argued for an investor-licensing regime that would
classify investors according to their informational resources and provide more securities
law protection to those investors with less information. Stephen Choi, Regulating
Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000). Choi
summarizes the scheme: “much like a pilot’s license, investors would need an
investment license to deal with particular types of capital market participants.” Id. at

GERDING - FINAL

2007:5

12/5/2007 3:16 PM

Laws Against Bubbles

1009

traditional logic of investor protection on its head: rather than
protecting individual investors from the ravages of markets, these
policies look to protect markets from the ravages of individual
investors.
A second approach to counter positive-feedback investing is using
tax policy to increase the costs to investors who rapidly flip assets. A
number of prominent economists and legal scholars have advocated
various forms of taxes—from increasing short-term–capital-gains tax
rates to instituting a transaction tax—to curb excessive speculation and
improve market efficiency.159
Circuit breakers and reverse circuit breakers represent a third
alternative to combating asset-price bubbles and excessive speculation.
Although not the only justification for circuit breakers, one theory
behind these mechanisms is to provide investors with a cooling-off
period to reconsider participating in the herd behavior that may drive
meteoric price rises or crashes.160
As with the first category of antibubble policies, many of the ideas
to break feedback loops can be found in existing law and regulation.
The first approach, restricting the access of unsophisticated investors to
certain markets or channeling these investors into less risky
investments, is implicit in the way in which securities-law exemptions
create tiers of investors. Certain exemptions from the registration
requirements of federal securities law allow institutional investors,161
investors with high net worth,162 or investors that meet certain
sophistication standards163 to invest in securities that are accompanied
by less disclosure. Furthermore, the Investment Company Act contains

283. Choi compares his proposal to the existing securities-law regime of exemptions to
issuer registration that attempts to tailor information requirements according to the
sophistication of investors. Id. at 305–07; see also Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 279,
282–83 (considering restricting access of investors to markets or investor licensing
schemes to combat investor speculation).
159. See supra note 11.
160. See Gabaldon, supra note 9, at 283 (advocating reverse circuit breakers
for this reason); SHILLER, supra note 15, at 225–26 (describing this rationale but
questioning the effectiveness of circuit breakers).
161. Rule 144A of the Securities Act of 1933 allows private resale of securities
to “qualified institutional buyers.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2007).
162. Rules 505 and 506 of Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 do not
require disclosure to “accredited investors” and do not count these investors toward the
limit on the number of purchasers in their respective exemptions. Id. §§ 230.505–.506.
Regulation D defines “accredited investors” as certain institutions and individuals
whose net worth exceeds certain thresholds. Id. § 230.501(a).
163. Under an exemption in Rule 506, issuers may still sell securities to
investors that are not accredited, see supra note 162, provided that these nonaccredited
investors meet certain sophistication standards. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
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exemptions for issuers whose stock is owned by certain institutions or
high-net-worth individuals.164 These exemptions allow many hedge
funds to act outside the purview of that statute.165 Commodities laws
and regulations contain similar exemptions for institutions and high-networth individuals.166 This tiering of investors could be thought of not
only as tailoring the disclosure requirements and protections of the
federal securities laws to the protection needs of certain classes of
investors167 but also as effectively channeling lower-net-worth and less
sophisticated individual investors toward less risky investments.168
Using tax policy to curb speculation—the second approach to
cutting positive-feedback investment loops—is an element of existing
tax and securities rules in the United States. The difference between
short-term and long-term capital gains taxes169 and securities rules that

164. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7) (2000).
165. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J.
1375, 1382 n.33 (2007).
166. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial
Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002
U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 333 n.488.
167. This logic of tailoring disclosure to meet the needs of investors for
protection was adopted by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S.
119, 124–25 (1953) (determining whether a securities offering was a “public offering,”
and thus not entitled to the private-offering exemption from registration requirements,
by looking to the sophistication of the investors).
168. Interpreting exemptions with an eye towards matching investors with risk
accords with the way many in the federal-securities bar interpret Ralston Purina. See
supra note 167; Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Am. Bar Ass’n, Section
4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 BUS. LAW. 485, 491–95 (1975) (arguing that one factor in
interpreting Ralston Purina and applying the private-placement exemption from federal
securities laws should be the purchaser’s risk-bearing ability). However, the mere fact
that securities are registered with the SEC and are sold with increased disclosure does
not guarantee that they are less risky than securities sold pursuant to an exemption. This
tiering effect is reinforced by other securities laws that require securities intermediaries
to take into account the specific circumstances of individual clients in providing advice
and facilitating investments. The suitability requirements imposed on broker-dealers by
the National Association of Securities Dealers represents the most prominent example
of this type of rule. See Daniel G. Schmedlen, Jr., Broker-Dealer Sales Practice in
Derivatives Transactions: A Survey and Evaluation of Suitability Requirements, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1441, 1456 (1995) (analyzing National Association of Securities
Dealers suitability requirements in the context of derivative sales); National Association
of Securities Dealers, Rules of the Association, Rule 2310 (2007), available at http://
finra.complinet.com/finra/index.html (“Recommendations to Customers (Suitability)”).
169. C. Thomas Paschall, U.S. Capital Gains Taxes: Arbitrary Holding
Periods, Debatable Tax Rates, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 843, 861–64 (2000) (arguing that
legislators in the United States and Europe intended that holding periods for capitalgains taxes would discourage speculation).
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require certain inside investors to disgorge short-swing profits170
already combine to impose costs on flipping and discourage
speculation. Other countries have also experimented with more direct
transaction taxes to cool speculation and correct mispricings from
potential bubbles. Most recently, in May 2007, China imposed higher
taxes on stock trades to curb what many saw as a rising stock-market
bubble.171
Circuit breakers, the third approach noted above, have been in
place in several U.S. financial exchanges, including for almost two
decades in the New York Stock Exchange.172
3.

REMOVING BARRIERS TO ARBITRAGE

Rather than create policy incentives to break the feedback loops of
noise traders, the final antibubble approach in the behavioral finance
template is to allow the market to correct mispricings by removing
barriers to arbitrage. In particular, a number of prominent scholars,
with different views on the rationality of markets, have argued that
restrictions on short sales, such as the tick test, should be removed to
promote market efficiency.173 As noted above, in June 2007, the SEC
repealed the tick test in part to promote the efficient pricing of stock
markets.174
4.

TIGHTENING CREDIT

Other antibubble policies build not on microeconomic research on
noise traders but on macroeconomic research into the role that credit
policy can have in pricking asset-price bubbles. Macroeconomists
remain locked in debate regarding the wisdom of using monetary policy
to address asset-price inflation or to prevent or prick asset-price

170. Comment, Short-Swing Profits and the Ten Percent Rule, 9 STAN. L.
REV. 582, 586 (1957) (noting that Congress intended section 16(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act to discourage insider speculation).
171. Barboza & Bradsher, supra note 2.
172. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
173. E.g., Powers et al., supra note 13, at 264–70 (arguing for removal of the
uptick rule and other legal restrictions on short sales); Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law

Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC
Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 761–62 (1999) (noting that easing restrictions on short
sales may be a remedy for bubbles but may also increase market volatility).
174. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. At the same time, however, the
SEC did place additional restrictions on “naked” short selling, that is, when the
investor does not own and has not borrowed the securities it is selling short.
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bubbles.175 As monetary policy is less a subject for legal scholarship,
other scholars have focused on laws that restrict lending to investors,
such as federal margin regulations.176 The statute granting the SEC
authority to enforce margin regulations states that one of the principal
purposes of these regulations is to curb excessive speculation.177
Professor Roberta Karmel criticized the Federal Reserve and the SEC
for failing to use existing margin regulations to tighten credit to
investors and thus prevent the technology-stock bubble of the late
1990s.178

B. Using Experimental Asset Markets To Evaluate Effectiveness
Evaluating the effectiveness of the laws described above with
empirical evidence alone is difficult given (1) the problems with
identifying historical asset-price bubbles, outlined above,179 and (2) the
challenges of untangling causal links given that antibubble laws
represent only one of myriad economic factors affecting asset prices in
real markets.180 Experimental asset markets offer novel solutions to
both of these problems. First, economists can create simulated markets
where the securities being traded have definite fundamental value.181
Any experiment in which prices diverge significantly from fundamental
value indicates that an asset-price bubble has formed.182 Experimental

175. For a detailed account of this controversy, with emphasis on the approach
of the Central Bank of Japan during the real-estate bubble in that country during the late
1980’s, see Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of a Central Bank in a Bubble Economy, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1053 (1996). See also Kevin J. Lansing, Should the Fed React to the
Stock Market, FRBSF ECON. LETTER (Fed. Res. Bank of S.F. , Nov. 14, 2003).
176. E.g., Karmel, supra note 9, at 948. The Federal Reserve sets margin
requirements, see, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 220 (2007), which the SEC has authority to
enforce, 15 U.S.C. § 78(g) (2000).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 78b(3); JERRY W. MARKHAM & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
BROKER-DEALER OPERATIONS UNDER SECURITIES AND COMMODITIES LAW §§ 3.01–.02
(2001). Professors Markham and Hazen note that the Federal Reserve has reset margin
rates twenty-five times in history “to squelch speculation in the case of increases or to
ease access to the market during downturns” and that “most actively traded stock is
today subject to a margin requirement of fifty percent.” MARKHAM & HAZEN, supra, §
3.01–.02.
178. See Karmel, supra note 9, at 948. Paralleling the margin regulations,
federal commodities law authorizes regulators to impose position limits on investors in
commodity exchanges, and the authorizing statute likewise recites the objective of
curbing harmful speculation. 7 U.S.C. § 6a.
179. See supra Part II.A.
180. Proving the negative, for example, that an asset bubble has been
prevented, presents particular challenges.
181. Porter & Smith, supra note 23, at 111.
182. Smith et al., supra note 131, at 1125–28.
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asset markets, unlike empirical studies, allow experimenters to create
risk not uncertainty for their subjects.
Second, economists can mimic antibubble laws in these markets by
controlling for both environmental conditions and trading rules. The
careful design of these controls allows experimental economists to
isolate causal links with greater precision than many empirical tests.183
1.

VALIDITY OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS IN GENERAL

Generating conclusions from the laboratory that would apply to the
real world requires that the experiments have a requisite degree of
realism or “validity.” Experimental economists have identified three
assumptions that must hold true for experiments to generate
implications for real-world markets.184 First, experiment subjects must
prefer receiving more money to less.185 This assumption guarantees that
experiments have internal validity. Monetary payoffs made to subjects
according to their performance in the experiment must induce
preferences in the subjects.186 Over the last two decades, experimental
economists have provided extensive support for this assumption; studies
have shown that even small payoffs cause experimental subjects to
behave in predictable ways.187 Experimental economists have responded
to a persistent critique that the small stakes involved undermine the
internal validity of experiments,188 with extensive support that even
small payoffs cause participants to take their performance in the
experiments seriously.189 Economists further argue that monetary
payoffs in experimental asset markets, such as those discussed below,

183. Smith, supra note 33, at 923–35.
184. Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 30, at 991.
185. Id.
186. Vernon L. Smith, Experimental Economics: Induced Value Theory, AM.
ECON. REV., MAY 1976, at 274, 274–77.
187. See, e.g., Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of

Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production
Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1999) (analyzing seventy-four experimental

studies to determine whether incentive levels or monetary versus nonmonetary payoffs
improved subject performance).
188. Even early reactions among legal scholars reflected this concern. See,
e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 73
n.69 (1987) (critiquing whether experiments used to support Coase Theorem are valid
given the small stakes involved).
189. E.g., Camerer & Hogarth, supra note 187.
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improve validity over experiments with nonmonetary payoffs,190 such as
experiments in which coffee mugs are traded.191
This concern over the realism of incentives in experiments points
to the second assumption underlying experimental economics—that the
basic rules governing individual behavior in the real economy also
govern subjects in the experiment.192 Experimental economics rests on a
final assumption—sometimes labeled “parallelism”—that all relevant
features of actual markets have been incorporated into simulated
markets.193
2.

BASIC DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTAL ASSET MARKETS

In evaluating whether the experimental asset markets that test for
bubbles meet the second and third criteria, it is crucial to carefully
evaluate their design.194 When constructing these markets, Professor
Vernon Smith established an experiment protocol to allow other
researchers to replicate the research.195 According to the protocol, and
in addition to the experiment parameters described above,196 a fixed
number of traders bought and sold a uniform security in a doublecontinuous auction conducted through a computer network. Traders
were given an initial endowment of shares and cash and, at the end of
the experiment, received the sum of any cash remaining, all dividends
paid on shares when held, and any capital gains from trading less any

190. Ralph Hertwig & Andreas Ortmann, Experimental Practices in
Economics: A Methodological Challenge for Psychologists?, 24 BEHAVIORAL & BRAIN

SCIS. 383, 401 (2001).
191. As one example, proponents of behavioral law and economics have
referenced various experiments in which subjects traded coffee mugs as evidence of the
“endowment effect” (the propensity for individuals to place a higher value on objects
they already own than on objects they do not). See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 86, at
1483 (citing Daniel Kahneman, et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and
the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325, 1329–42 (1990)). This reliance of
behavioral economics on fairly basic experiments, many with nonmonetary payoffs,
may explain persistent criticism of behavioral law and economics. See, e.g., Richard
A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV.
1551, 1565–67 (1998) (critiquing conclusions drawn by the authors above from coffeemug experiments).
192. Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 30, at 992–93.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 993.
195. For the basic formulation of this protocol, see Smith et al., supra note
131, at 1122–25. This Section describes the general parameters of the experiments
conducted by Smith and colleagues. When other experimental asset markets that had
different parameters are considered in Part III.C, differences from this general design
are noted.
196. See supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
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capital losses. In any trading period, a trader could either buy or sell by
pressing a simple series of keys on their computer terminal. A trader
could buy the security if he or she had sufficient cash holdings to pay
the purchase price and sell as long as he or she had the shares to
complete the sale.197
Experiments lasted for a preannounced number of trading
periods.198 Each trading period ended either with unanimous consent of
all participants or at the end of a preannounced period of time.199 The
markets combined a bid-ask–spread-reduction rule with a rank-queue
limit-order file, that is, bids to buy below the highest standing bid and
offers to sell above the lowest standing offer were not rejected but
queued in a limit-order file. Once a bid and offer were matched and a
contract occurred, the highest queued bid and the lowest queued offer
became the new bid-ask spread. Traders were aware of the position of
their bids and offers in the limit-order file and could withdraw them at
any time.200
This basic protocol has been followed in numerous experiments
over the last two decades. In each experiment, economists were able to
compare period by period the prices set by the traders with the
fundamental, or “intrinsic price,” of the security being traded (with
fundamental value equaling the expected dividend value multiplied by
the number of trading periods remaining in the experiment). As
previously noted, in a wide range of experiments, trade prices shot
above intrinsic value, crashing back down to that value only in the final
trading period.201
3.

EXPERIMENTAL CONTROLS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON BUBBLES

These bubble results prompted early reviewers to note how these
experimental markets may not have reflected material attributes of real
markets that would have prevented such mispricings.202 In response to
these critiques, Smith and other researchers introduced new variables in
the experiments to test whether alternative conditions found in real-

197. Smith et al., supra note 131, at 1122–25.
198. In most of Smith’s experiments there were fifteen trading periods. See,
e.g., King et al., supra note 24, at 183.
199. Generally, the trading period lasted a maximum of four minutes. Smith et
al., supra note 131, at 1124.
200. King et al., supra note 24, at 184; Smith et al., supra note 131, at 1122–
25.
201. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
202. See Caginalp et al., supra note 131, at 26–32 (describing changes to the
experimental environment to make experiments match attributes of real markets).
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world securities markets might prevent, prick, or dampen bubbles.
These new control variables included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Informing traders of the results of previous experiments203
Repeating experiments to give traders experience204
Allowing traders to enter into futures contracts205
Varying the financial sophistication of traders206
Changing the relative initial endowments of cash and shares
held by traders207
Charging a fee for trades208
Implementing capital-gains taxes209
Instituting circuit breakers210
Restricting the resale of purchased securities211
Allowing traders to make short sales212
Allowing traders to buy securities on margin213

The introduction of these controls gave experimental asset markets
many features of real securities markets and replicated many antibubble
laws. As described in Part III.C, bubbles in asset markets proved
robust to the introduction of most of these controls.

203. Traders were given copies of previous studies of experimental asset
markets that showed prices exceeded fundamental value. E.g., King et al., supra note
24, at 190–94.
204. Multiple experiments were rerun with at least some traders having
participated in earlier experiment iterations. See, e.g., King et al., supra note 24, at
186–200; Smith et al., supra note 131, at 1133–36.
205. Porter & Smith, supra note 23, at 120.
206. Criticisms of the validity of early experiments that used undergraduate
economics students as traders were addressed by later experiments that used smallbusiness people, corporate executives, and stock-market dealers as subjects. Caginalp et
al., supra note 131, at 28.
207. Compare Smith et al., supra note 131, at 1124 (using unequal endowments
of cash and assets), with King et al., supra note 24, at 189 (“buyers [tend] to be those
subjects with endowments large in cash and small in shares; the reverse holds for
sellers.”).
208. King et al., supra note 24, at 190.
209. Vivian Lei et al., Asset Bubbles and Rationality: Additional Evidence
from Capital Gains Tax Experiments 1–2 (Cal. Inst. of Tech., Working Paper No.
1137, June 2002), available at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1137.pdf.
210. King et al., supra note 24, at 194–95.
211. Lei et al., supra note 137, at 834.
212. King et al., supra note 24, at 186–88.
213. Id. at 188–89.
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EXTERNAL VALIDITY AND LIMITATIONS OF BASIC DESIGN

It is crucial, however, to highlight some of the limitations of these
experiments before attempting to draw legal and policy conclusions
from them. This Section highlights certain limitations to the general
design of the experimental asset markets described above. Limitations
on results from specific experiments that mimic antibubble laws are
described in Part III.C.
By necessity, experiments need to simplify the complex
mechanisms present in real-world markets, but five general limitations
regarding experiments conducted under the Smith protocol stand out.
First, traders were given the rewards of their performance,214 but they
did not have to pay losses from their own pockets.215 This may have
skewed experimental results somewhat as behavioral economists have
documented asymmetries in the appetites of individuals for bearing risk
that would lead participants to make gains-versus-risk assessments that
would cause greater-than-expected losses. For example, gamblers
playing with house money tend to make riskier bets.216 Nevertheless, a
different set of experiments in which subjects traded their own money
also produced bubbles.217 The similarities in the results of these studies
(despite their different design features) suggest that the Smith protocol’s
failure to impose losses on subjects is not fatal to its validity.218
Second, real securities markets do not end after a predetermined
number of trading periods. This leads to a possible objection that

214. Caginalp et al., supra note 131, at 26.
215. Camerer & Hogarth, supra note 187, at 36 (“Because it is generally
difficult to impose losses or punishments on subjects for bureaucratic reasons—
university committees that approve protocols involving human subjects strongly object
to it—we do not know how earning money and losing money differ.”).
216. Behavioral-economics literature often recites the “loss-aversion” bias
(i.e., that individuals are willing to take on less risk that would lead to losses than risk
that would lead to the same amount of gains). See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al.,
Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 1991, at 193; Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality
Bias in Legal Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 601–02 (2003).
217. James S. Ang & Thomas Schwarz, Risk Aversion and Information
Structure: An Experimental Study of Price Variability in the Securities Markets, 40 J.
FIN. 825, 830–31 (1985).
218. Nevertheless, the Ang and Schwarz experiments in which traders invested
with their own money did not feature the full set of controls—including all of the
controls that mimic the various antibubble laws—that the experiments following the
Smith protocol did. See supra note 216. The potential for skewed results in the Smith
protocol experiments—because subjects were “playing with house money”—argues for
rerunning the Ang and Schwarz experiments with controls that mimic more antibubble
laws.
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crashes would chasten traders.219 Experimenters considered this, and
many studies repeated the experiments several times with the same
traders.220 Indeed, experience did significantly dampen the propensity of
traders to bid prices above fundamental value.221 Thus, experience
dampens bubbles in the experiments, but “experience” means
participating in experimental asset markets and experiencing a bubble
and crash, not real-world financial experience. Experiments featuring
individuals with real-world financial experience as traders—smallbusiness owners, stock brokers, and executives—produced bubbles.222
Third, it is also possible that, in each experiment, a looming final
horizon made traders try to achieve unrealistically high short-term
gains. This objection is harder to address, as the finite number of
trading periods was a necessary component of establishing certain
fundamental value for the securities.223
The elegance of the experimental controls creates a fourth potential
limitation. Although some experiments tried introducing various
policies and environmental features in combination, the experiments
may have missed potential combinations of controls that might together
have reduced the incidence or severity of mispricings. It is possible that
the aggregate effect of multiple antibubble laws on reducing mispricings
may be greater than a sum of their individual effects. Without resorting
to a “kitchen sink” approach, future experiments might productively
test additional combinations of controls, such as allowing short sales
and futures contracting, simultaneously.

219. Smith et al., supra note 131, at 1133 (noting this potential flaw).
220. See supra note 204.
221. Caginalp et al., supra note 131, at 26.
222. King et al., supra note 24, at 196–97.
223. Other experiment-based asset-market research supports the hypothesis that
short horizons promote bubble formation. See Shinichi Hirota & Shyam Sunder, Price
Bubbles Sans Dividend Anchors: Evidence from Laboratory Stock Markets, 31 J.
ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 1875 (2007).
Some scholars have raised a related criticism, namely that Smith’s design
predetermined a crash by setting fundamental values to decline to zero. These scholars
found that when fundamental value was held constant prices of securities traded close to
fundamental value. Dean Johnson & Patrick Joyce, Bubbles and Crashes Revisited
(Oct. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.gate.cnrs.fr/seminaires/
2006_2007/Joyce.pdf). But this research does not appear to have been replicated. Other
studies of experimental asset markets with a flat fundamental value showed recurring
bubbles. E.g., Charles Noussair et al., Price Bubbles in Laboratory Asset Markets with
Constant Fundamental Values, 4 EXPERIMENTAL ECON. 87 (2001); AJ Bostian et al.,
Price Bubbles in Asset Market Experiments with a Flat Fundamental Value (Aug. 30,
2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.atl-res.com/finance/
conference_pdf/HoltFinal.pdf).
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The fifth limitation of the experiments is their applicability to realestate markets. The economic characteristics described in Part II.D that
differentiate
real estate
from securities assets—durability,
heterogeneity, possession of consumption value—also limit the
parallelism of liquid experimental asset markets to actual real-estate
markets.224 Therefore, an evaluation of the effectiveness of antibubble
laws with respect to real-estate markets must give much greater weight
to empirical evidence than to these experimental studies.
Legal scholars might raise a final concern about the use of
experimental asset markets to justify laws or regulations, namely that
motivated individuals will find loopholes in real-world laws. But this
objection is asymmetric; it does not support the reverse contention that
the many antibubble policies that appeared ineffective in experiments
may have greater effect in actual markets.

C. Evaluating the Evidence
Bearing in mind these limitations of experimental asset markets,
experimental evidence can be used, together with empirical evidence, to
evaluate the effectiveness of the antibubble laws outlined in Part III.A.
1.

IMPROVING FUNDAMENTAL INFORMATION TO INVESTORS AND
INFORMATION PROCESSING OF INVESTORS

Evidence from experimental asset markets draws into question the
effect that enhanced disclosure requirements and mandated investoreducation programs would have in preventing, pricking, or mitigating
the severity of asset-price bubbles.

a. Disclosure
Bubbles formed in experimental asset markets even when investors
were given all the information necessary to compute fundamental
value.225 Calculating expected future dividends required investors to
perform simple multiplication.226 The experimenters could have
224. For example, traders in these virtual markets could not have enjoyed any
consumption value from the securities being traded, but real-estate investors often do
place such a value on their properties. Supra note 141.
225. Porter and Smith phrase the conclusion: “Public information in intrinsic
dividend (or net asset) value is not sufficient to induce common expectations and
trading at fundamental value.” Porter & Smith, supra note 23, at 114.
226. Fundamental value equaled (1) the probability of a dividend multiplied by
(2) the amount of a possible dividend multiplied by (3) the number of trading periods
remaining in the experiment. See King et al., supra note 24, at 183.
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performed the math for the investors, but in real-world markets,
disclosure is unlikely to ever provide as clear an indication of an asset’s
fundamental value as the information given to subjects in these
experiments.227 The fact that bubbles formed when dividend uncertainty
was removed (or, more accurately, converted into risk) suggests that
even very high-quality disclosure to investors with respect to
fundamental value will not eliminate bubbles.
This experimental evidence should not lead to the conclusion that
mandatory-disclosure regimes have no prophylactic effect on
mispricings. The fact that supplying investors with near-perfect
information on fundamentals does not eliminate bubbles does not lead
to a conclusion that disclosing imperfect information relevant to
fundamentals would have no effect on reducing the incidence or
magnitude of bubbles. Bubbles may have been more severe had the
information on fundamental value been more opaque, imperfect, noisy,
or even absent.
However, it is important to underscore again that these experimental
asset markets allowed researchers to create known fundamental value
and thus test investors under conditions of risk but not uncertainty. In
real markets, investors face uncertainty about true fundamental value. It
is possible, although not convincing, that under conditions of
uncertainty, investors would be more responsive to disclosure—or other
antibubble laws for that matter—than under conditions of risk. One
theory is that investors were less risk averse and exhibited more
overconfidence in experiments because they knew that they could
theoretically recognize a guaranteed profit opportunity, since success
could be calculated on the basis of definite probabilities.228
These limitations on using experimental results to judge the effects
of disclosure laws on bubbles argue for a greater consideration of
empirical studies. Empirical data comparing the incidence of bubbles in
countries with varying levels of securities disclosure requirements has
indicated that countries with weaker requirements tend to suffer more
asset-price bubbles, and their asset-price bubbles tend to last longer and
have a greater magnitude of mispricing.229 In Asia, in particular,

227. Supra notes 134–35 and accompanying text.
228. Because the value of experimental asset markets lies in large part on
having known fundamental values and thus being able to identify bubbles with
certainty, it would be logically problematic to test whether experiment subjects
operating in an environment of true uncertainty would be more or less likely to create
bubbles. Again, using risk as a proxy for uncertainty may be unavoidable in this area of
economics, but it also limits the validity of research.
229. William R. White, What Have We Learned from Recent Financial Crises
and Policy Responses?, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISES: LESSONS FROM RECENT EVENTS
177 (Joseph R. Bisignano et al. eds., 2000). These findings mesh with broader studies
that have found a connection between investor-protection laws and the depth of a
nation’s securities markets. SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 191–92 (surveying studies
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economists have noted an inverse correlation between the incidence of
asset-price bubbles and the strength and enforcement of a country’s
securities and financial disclosure requirements.230
Reconciling this experimental and empirical evidence leads to a
conclusion that, although there is evidence that disclosure requirements
may decrease the incidence and magnitude of bubbles, enhancing
disclosure may have a decreasing marginal effect. Moreover, it would
be a mistake to conclude that more disclosure is inevitably better.
Investors can face “information overload” and may be unable to
cognitively process more information.231 In the case of more complex
financial products, information asymmetries may be impossible to
overcome with disclosure and education.232
Unfortunately, the empirical research outlined above was not
designed to produce the optimally effective level or type of disclosure,
and the antibubble disclosure proposals noted above provide little
specificity as to what enhanced disclosure requirements might look like.
Any additional disclosure will have to contend with two further
limitations. First, the information marketplace becomes particularly
crowded during booms; even cogent evidence that asset prices exceed
fundamental values will face counterarguments, including “New Era”
logic contending that fundamental changes in the economy have
rendered conventional means of asset valuation obsolete.233 This
cacophony of opinions may explain the repeated failure throughout
history of attempts by central bankers and other governmental officials
to talk down or “jawbone” suspected asset-price bubbles.234
Second, investors often choose to ignore additional disclosure in
boom times; throughout much of the last decade, bidders who hoped to

showing a correlation between nations’ investor-protection regimes and success in
developing well-functioning and deep securities markets).
230. See, e.g., STEPHAN HAGGARD, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE ASIAN
FINANCIAL CRISIS 19 (2000); Robert Chote, Financial Crises: The Lessons of Asia, in
FINANCIAL CRISES AND ASIA 1, 10 (1998).
231. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 441 (2003).
232. Jeffrey Carmichael & Neil Esho, Asset-Price Bubbles and Prudential
Regulation, in ASSET-PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 18, at 481, 491.
233. See SHILLER, supra note 15, at 96–132 (describing how popular
perceptions during stock market expansions that “the future is brighter or less uncertain
than it was in the past” can lead to asset-price bubbles).
234. The warning by Federal Reserve Chairman Greenspan in 1996 that the
stock market was “irrationally exuberant” represents a recent example of such a failed
attempt. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 37, at 7. For historical surveys of the futility of
official warnings that a bubble may be occurring (in part, because of contrary
statements by other officials), see id. at 91–94; CHANCELLOR, supra note 56, at 151,
230–31.
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buy a house in “hot” real-estate markets, such as Washington, D.C.,
decided that they needed to waive inspection and appraisal rights in
their offers.235

b. Information from futures markets
Futures markets appear to provide information to investors that is
much more effective in reducing the magnitude of asset-price bubbles.
Based on experimental asset markets in which certain experienced
traders could enter into futures contracts and other traders could see the
prices of these contracts,236 experimenters concluded that “futures
markets dampen, but do not eliminate, bubbles by speeding up the
process by which traders form common expectations.”237 Traders who
can better calculate fundamental values can set futures prices and send a
clear signal to others in the market of long-term expectations for these
values.
Experimental evidence would support economist arguments that
developing futures markets for real estate and other asset classes will
not only allow investors to mitigate risk but also provide them with
clearer information on potential mispricings.238 But real-world futures
are complex financial instruments, and it is questionable whether many
“noise traders” would be able to understand the price signals they send.

c. Investor education
One response to the inability of investors to understand futures
would be enhanced investor-education programs, but, like disclosure,
the evidence of the effectiveness of investor education is mixed. Even
in experimental asset markets with more–financially sophisticated

235. Daniela Deane, Higher Prices, Tougher Choices, WASH. POST, Mar. 23,
2005, at H1.
236. Porter & Smith, supra note 23, at 120. Experimenters first conducted a
series of two-period training sequences in which traders could enter into futures
contracts in period one and the contracts would mature in period two. This taught
traders “that a futures contract is equivalent to a cash contract in the period in which it
expires, and should trade at the same price.” Caginalp et al., supra note 131, at 30. In
the actual experimental markets with fifteen trading periods, traders could enter into
spot and futures contracts for the first eight periods, with futures contracts expiring in
period eight. After the eighth period, traders could only enter into spot contracts.
Caginalp et al., supra note 131, at 30.
237. Porter & Smith, supra note 23, at 120; see also Charles Noussair &
Steven Tucker, Futures Markets and Bubble Formation in Experimental Asset Markets,
11 PAC. ECON. REV. 167 (2006).
238. Supra notes 147 and 157 and accompanying text. This finding meshes with
the heterogeneous-expecations model of bubbles.
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traders—small-business persons,239 securities brokers,240 and corporate
executives241—bubbles formed. On the other hand, in experiments with
subjects who were advanced graduate students in economics and
familiar with game theory, prices closely tracked fundamental value.242
Experimenters even attempted one form of investor education by
giving another set of graduate-student subjects copies of earlier studies
that analyzed how bubbles formed in similar experimental asset
markets. Merely providing this information did not prevent a bubble
from occurring; only a combination of having subjects read these
studies and repeat the experiment and be allowed to engage in short
selling led to prices tracking fundamental value, albeit roughly.243
But any inference that investor-education policies might work to
counter bubbles based on the success of graduate students literate in
game theory must be severely tempered. Economics graduate students
familiar with experimental literature are likely to intuit the researchers’
objectives. Subjects focusing on the experimental conceit would
undermine the second fundamental assumption of experimental
economics—that human behavior in the experiments mirrors behavior
in real markets.244

d. Experiencing a bubble and a crash
The ultimate form of investor education, and the one most
effective in preventing bubbles, appears to be the experience of
participating in the rise and crash of a bubble. One of the strongest
findings in experimental economics has been the effects of experience.
After investors experience and participate in an asset-price bubble and a
subsequent crash in one experiment, they are much less likely to bid
prices higher than fundamental value in subsequent iterations of the
experiment.245 In fact, when other experiments that control for other
policies and market features are repeated, it appears that it is

239. Smith et al., supra note 131, at 1130–31.
240. King et al., supra note 24, at 196–97.
241. Id.
242. Caginalp et al., supra note 131, at 28–29. Undergraduate economics
students produced dramatic bubbles in trading. Id.
243. King et al., supra note 24, at 190–93. But, if the percentage of traders
who lacked experience in the experimental asset markets and were not informed of the
studies is too high, bubbles formed as “experienced” and “informed” traders did not
have sufficient resources to undercut bubble prices through short selling. Id. at 193–94.
244. Supra note 192 and accompanying text.
245. Caginalp et al., supra note 131, at 26; Smith et al., supra note 131, at
1133–36.
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experience, not these other factors, that reduces the duration and
amplitude of mispricing and the volatility and turnover of trading.246
Experimental evidence of the chastening effects that experiencing a
bubble crash has on investor speculation accords with the findings of
economic historians that asset-price bubbles tend to form in a particular
market only after a significant period of time—sometimes a decade or
more after the last significant crash.247
But this pattern may be an oversimplification. The collapse of one
bubble may not inoculate investors or an economy from the rise of any
asset bubbles for the foreseeable future; some economists have
speculated that the crash of a bubble in one asset market can drive
liquidity to another asset market and ignite speculation there
(particularly if a central bank keeps interest rates low after the collapse
of the first bubble). In fact, some economists tie the recent credit boom,
which fueled corporate takeovers and real-estate speculation and then
crashed in July 2007, to the Federal Reserve keeping interest rates low
in the wake of the bursting of the technology-stock bubble in 2000.248
Economists have posited that international links between economies
allow investors looking to invest returns earned from an asset bubble in
one country to fuel speculation in other countries. 249
In short, a bubble in one asset class in one country may not
chasten investors from creating a bubble in another type of asset or
another market. Moreover, influxes of new generations of investors
who have not experienced a bubble crash raise the risk of fresh market
mispricings.250

246. See King et al., supra note 24, at 188–200.
247. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 37, at 13 (“[S]ome time must elapse after one
speculative mania that ends in crisis before investors have recovered sufficiently from
their losses and disillusionment to be willing to take a flyer again.”); see also SHILLER,
supra note 15, at 96–117 (surveying episodes of “new era economic thinking” in the
United States in the twentieth century, which occurs “in pulses.”)
248. For an accessible account of this theory, see Greg Ip & Jon E. Hilsenrath,
Debt Bomb, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2007, at A1.
249. Some economists believe that currency crises in China are having this
effect on markets in other countries. Id. Economists have also studied the reverse
problem of crashes in one market having cross-border effects through stock-market and
other economic interlinkages. See, e.g., Michael D. Bordo & Antu Panini Murshid,
Globalization and Changing Patterns in Crisis Transmission, in ASSET-PRICE BUBBLES,
supra note 18, at 309, 309–22.
250. Economists have created “overlapping-generations” models to study the
potential effects of new investors entering markets. See, e.g., Jean Tirole, Asset-Price
Bubbles and Overlapping Generations, 53 ECONOMETRICA 1071 (1985) (concluding that
new generations of investors overlapping with older generations allow bubbles to form).
If new generations enter asset markets more quickly, the chastening effect of assetbubble crashes may have a shorter duration.
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Notwithstanding the fact that bubbles may recur sooner and with
greater frequency in the real world than in experimental asset markets,
experimental evidence of the powerful chastening effects of
experiencing a bubble crash raises profound questions for policymakers
and scholars. Assuming certain policies are effective in reducing the
incidence or magnitude of bubbles, implementing these policies might
deprive investors of the chastening education of losing money. This
raises the question of whether even effective antibubble laws might
merely lead to less frequent but more severe bubbles. More concretely,
policies that may not prevent bubbles but that remove their sting for
investors create a very real risk of moral hazard. If investors feel less
pain from losing money during a bubble crash, experimental evidence
would suggest that the learning effects on investors would be
compromised.
2.

SHORT CIRCUITING POSITIVE-FEEDBACK INVESTMENT LOOPS

a. Restricting access of unsophisticated investors and “tiering”
Much of the same evidence that questions the effectiveness of
disclosure and investor education also draws into question whether
policies that restrict access of certain investors to markets will mitigate
mispricings. More precisely, this evidence calls into question
assumptions of who should be restricted from riskier markets. Given
the propensity of small-business people, corporate executives, and
securities dealers to create bubbles in experiments,251 existing categories
for tiering investors may have faulty assumptions. Securities-law
exemptions that rely on high-net-worth and “financial-sophistication”
standards to provide less information and protection to certain
investors252 may not be tailored properly.
Who would fall within an optimal sophisticated-investor category
remains unclear. There is a tension in behavioral-finance literature: On
the one hand, behavioral finance often differentiates between irrational
noise traders and “smart money,” or arbitrageurs.253 On the other hand,
many behavioral-finance studies document behavioral biases in
securities professionals and arbitrageurs who would fall into the smartmoney camp.254
“Noise traders” and “smart money” are useful theoretical
constructs for models, but formulating policy based on this distinction
251.
252.
253.
254.

Supra note 222 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 172.
E.g., La Blanc & Rachlinkski, supra note 125, at 570–74.
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requires much more evidence of which types of investors fall into
which category. Much work remains in constructing a more nuanced
(perhaps even demographic) profile of noise traders, and experimental
economics could prove a valuable tool. Some experimental-asset-market
studies have already attempted to screen traders based on personality
and risk preference and then measure which traders drive bubble
prices.255 Further-nuanced studies could attempt to draw correlations in
which certain experiment subjects (1) exhibit specific behavioral biases
in the context of basic behavioral experiments of the type that
documented the heuristics and behavioral biases outlined in Part
II.B.2,256 (2) exhibit certain patterns in brain-imaging experiments, and
then (3) pay bubble prices in experimental asset markets. Being able to
categorize investors might also enable scholars to investigate whether
certain antibubble laws, even if generally ineffective, might work with
certain classes of investors.

b. Transaction and capital-gains taxes
An array of evidence suggests that transaction and capital-gains
taxes will have mixed results in preventing bubbles. In one
experimental asset market, a moderate transaction tax257 did not
eliminate bubbles or reduce their duration, but it did reduce the
amplitude of a bubble.258 Oddly, this transaction tax increased the
turnover of shares for traders inexperienced with the experiments.259 In
another experiment, a fifty-percent–capital-gains tax likewise did not
reduce the tendency of bubbles to occur.260
This experimental evidence accords with the observation by one
economist that real-estate markets, which have higher transaction costs
than stock markets, still experience bubbles.261 Moreover, countries that

255. Shyam Sunder, Experiment Asset Markets: A Survey, in THE HANDBOOK
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 445, 489 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth Sunder eds.,
1995) (summarizing one set of studies).
256. Supra notes 88–91.
257. King et al., supra note 24, at 190. One experiment charged an exchange
fee of $0.20 on each transaction, split equally between buyer and seller. To give a
sense of the reasonableness of this tax, the intrinsic value of one share started at $3.50
at the beginning of the experiment and declined linearly to zero at the end of fifteen
trading periods. Assuming turnover of six-times total shares, $0.20 represents an
average cost of $1.20 per share. See id.
258. Id.
259. Id. The tax did have the expected effect of reducing turnover by
experienced traders. Id.
260. Lei et al., supra note 209, at 2, 4.
261. SHILLER, supra note 15, at 227; see also James R. Repetti, The Use of
Tax Law to Stabilize the Stock Market: The Efficacy of Holding Period Requirements,
OF
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impose higher transaction costs on trades do not seem to enjoy less
stock-market volatility.262 Of course, at a high-enough rate, transaction
taxes will deter speculation but at the potential cost of choking-off
liquidity in the market.
Proponents argue that these taxes will affect short-term speculators
more than long-term investors given that short-term speculators base
their decision on price behavior for more recent and narrower time
windows than long-term investors.263 But arbitrageurs are by nature also
short-term speculators, and transaction taxes would also impose
additional costs on arbitrageurs and could thus deter them from
correcting mispricings. Analyzing the relative effects of transaction
taxes on noise traders compared to arbitrageurs would require an
analysis of the relative elasticities of demand for an asset for each
group. Given the long-running debate about the slope of demand curves
for stocks in general,264 it is unlikely a consensus will emerge on this
question any time soon. Nonetheless, the surprising evidence from
experimental asset markets—that transaction taxes actually increase
stock turnover among inexperienced traders but decrease turnover for
experienced traders265—does not suggest that transaction taxes can
target noise traders and avoid arbitrageurs.

c. Circuit breakers
In both experiments and empirical studies, circuit breakers and
reverse circuit breakers appear to do little to prevent or mitigate
bubbles and often appear to exacerbate mispricings. Experimental asset
markets have introduced limited price-change rules similar to those
imposed by stock and futures markets. Specifically, trading is halted if
prices decline or rise beyond a set band around the price in a previous
trading period.266 Researchers have found that these rules exacerbate the

8 VA. TAX. REV. 591, 627–30 (1989) (arguing that holding-period requirements of
long-term–capital-gains-tax preferences and short-sale restrictions are not justified as
ways to deter speculation and may reinforce irrational investing and mispricing). Other
tax rules might help address mispricing during a bubble, but further study is needed.
262. Richard Roll, Price Volatility, International Market Links, and Their
Implications for Regulatory Policies, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RES. 211, 238 (1989).
263. SHILLER, supra note 15, at 227.
264. For one early salvo in this debate, see Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand
Curves for Stocks Slope Down?, 41 J. FIN 579 (1986).
265. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
266. King et al., supra note 24, at 194–95. The price band used in the
experiment was plus or minus thirty-two cents (which equaled twice the expected
dividend for any period). Id. at 195.
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magnitude of mispricings above fundamental value when compared to
baseline experiments.267
Empirical evidence also does not support the effectiveness of
circuit breakers in staving-off or mitigating price bubbles. Circuit
breakers that shut markets down for short periods of time are designed
to provide a cooling-off period for massive, short-term price swings;
they are not designed and remain unproven as a device for preventing
long-term mispricings, such as an extended stock-market bubble.268

d. Other resale restrictions
Evidence that holding periods that restrict resale of assets prevent
or mitigate the severity of bubbles is also very weak. On the
experimental side, one experimental asset market completely forbade
resale, yet a bubble still formed with results mirroring other
experimental asset markets.269 This result not only calls into question
the effectiveness of holding periods and other resale restrictions but
also conflicts with the theory that bubbles are driven by expectations of
capital gains (i.e., investors drive up prices because they are following
a “greater-fool” strategy).270
3.

ENABLING ARBITRAGE

Experimental and empirical evidence suggests that short sales can
only prevent or dampen bubbles if a number of conditions are met. In
an experimental asset market that allowed a minority of “more
sophisticated” traders to engage in short sales,271 bubbles still formed.
267. Id. at 195. The experimenters posited that the circuit breaker “accentuates
the severity of bubbles because traders perceive that their downside risk is limited by
the 32 or 48 cent bounds on price declines in each period.” Id. Only when the
experiment was rerun with traders “experienced” with previous experimental iterations,
did prices track fundamental value. But, this was the same result as in baseline
experiments comparing inexperienced and experienced traders without a circuit
breaker, which suggests that it is the experience of past bubbles and crashes, not circuit
breakers, that prevents mispricings. Id.; see also Lucy F. Ackert et al., An

Experimental Study of Circuit Breakers: the Effects of Mandated Market Closures and
Temporary Halts on Market Behavior, 4 J. FIN. MARKETS 185 (2001) (“[The] presence

of a circuit breaker rule does not affect the magnitude of the absolute deviation in price
from fundamental value . . . .”).
268. SHILLER, supra note 15, at 226.
269. Lei et al., supra note 137, at 841–45.
270. Id.
271. One experiment placed three graduate students who had read earlier
experimental asset studies (labeled “insiders”) in a market with six to nine
undergraduates who had not read the studies (“outsiders”). Insiders and outsiders had
the same share endowments, but insiders could sell two shares borrowed from
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Additionally, in some experiments the magnitude and duration of
mispricing during a bubble increased.272 Reviewing the short-sale
experiments, some of the experimenters noted that the “bubble forces
are so strong that the insiders273 are swamped by the buying wave.”274
Results from other experimental-asset-market studies also document the
limited effectiveness of short sales in preventing or dampening
bubbles.275
The conclusions from the short-sale experiments must remain
tentative since it is possible that these experiments may have overly
constrained short selling.276 In particular, with only one security being
traded on the market, traders selling short could not hedge by
purchasing substitute securities.277 Nevertheless, the constraints
imposed on short selling in these experimental asset markets do not deal
a fatal blow to the parallelism of these experiments. Again, arbitrage,
and short selling in particular, faces real-world limitations as well.278
This empirical evidence of the limits of arbitrage, other than legal
restrictions on short selling, together with the experimental evidence
above suggests that removing legal barriers to short selling may not

experimenters. Each of these shares had to be repurchased and repaid to the
experimenters or a penalty of one-half the initial dividend value would be imposed on
each share not repaid. It is unclear what the initial share endowment was. Caginalp et
al., supra note 131, at 27.
272. King et al., supra note 24, at 186–88. When short-sale experiments were
rerun to give traders experience, bubble magnitude decreased. However, as with the
circuit-breaker experiments, it appears as if experience, not short sales, was the
primary factor mitigating mispricings. See id. at 188–89, 199.
273. The insiders were the graduate students who were informed of past
experimental-asset-market research and had the capability of selling short, as described
above in note 263.
274. Caginalp et al., supra note 131, at 27–28.
275. See Sunder, supra note 255, at 448 (surveying other experimental asset
markets that tested for effects of short selling).
276. Conclusions on the limited effectiveness of short selling in reducing
bubbles could be made more robust by rerunning these experiments and changing the
parameters to further decrease the costs of short selling. For example, the experiment
could be rerun with the following parameters varied: (1) increasing the number of
shares the short sellers could borrow (it is difficult to interpret the results of the initial
survey because, while the number of shares that could be borrowed (two) is known, the
share endowments of each trader is not disclosed); (2) decreasing the penalty for not
repaying shares borrowed; (3) increasing the proportion of traders that could sell short
compared to the total number of traders; and (4) increasing the time horizon of the
short sellers.
277. The ability to purchase substitute securities allows arbitrageurs to mitigate
risk and is therefore critical to fully effective arbitrage. SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 3–
4.
278. See supra notes 98–104 and accompanying text.
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have a significant impact on preventing, pricking, or dampening
bubbles.
4.

INCREASING THE COSTS OF BORROWING: MARGIN

Experimental asset markets that introduced the opportunity for
traders to purchase shares on margin increased the amplitude of bubbles
with inexperienced traders compared to baseline experiments.279 “This
suggests that the common social policy of imposing margin
requirements may be effective in moderating stock market bubbles.”280
This accords with general empirical evidence on the effectiveness of
tightening credit on preventing and pricking asset-price bubbles.281
Although experimental evidence suggests that margin regulations
are targeting the right incentives, the empirical evidence supporting the
effectiveness of actual margin regulations in the United States282 to
reduce speculation ranges from weak to inconclusive.283 One possible
explanation of this limited effectiveness is that margin regulations may
be poorly designed. Margin regulations only prevent the extension of
credit to investors by certain lenders;284 investors continue to enjoy
other avenues of credit for purchasing stock.285
IV. THE COSTS OF BUBBLES V. THE COSTS OF ANTIBUBBLE LAWS
This Article has considered only the question of whether
antibubble laws would be effective. This leads to a larger question of
whether even effective antibubble laws are justified. To answer this,
this Part outlines the elements of a very rough cost-benefit analysis.

279. King et al., supra note 24, at 188–89. The results are more mixed in
experiments in which traders could both buy on margin and sell shares short. Id.
Allowing traders to gain experience by repeating the margin-buying experiments forced
prices to closely track fundamentals, but, again, this result did not significantly differ
from the baseline, which bolsters the inference that experience with bubbles and crashes
was the key determinant in reducing mispricing. Id.
280. Id. at 199.
281. See supra Part II.E.
282. E.g., 12 C.F.R. § 220 (2007).
283. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., ELECTRONIC BULLS AND
BEARS: U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 86 (1990); BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., A REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF FEDERAL
MARGIN REGULATIONS 44–50, 85–91 (1984); Stephen Figlewski, Margins and Market
Integrity: Margin Setting for Stock Index Futures and Options, 4 J. FUTURES MARKETS
385 (1984).
284. Regulation T, the principal margin regulation, only covers extensions of
credit by brokers and dealers. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1–.130.
285. Stout, supra note 173, at 730–31.
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Section A catalogues the potential economic costs posed by asset-price
bubbles and addresses the reasons why scholars propose that
policymakers implement antibubble laws. Section B provides a rough
inventory of the costs of antibubble laws themselves.

A. The Costs of Asset-Price Bubbles
The formation of asset-price bubbles poses significant economic
costs, which can be placed into three categories. First, mispriced assets
translate into the misallocation of economic resources; high prices in an
overvalued asset class divert capital from economic sectors that are not
overvalued.286 Professor Marcel Kahan explores the nuances of the
economic costs of mispricing and creates a comprehensive typology of
the various costs of inaccurate prices in the stock market.287 Kahan
details the ways and conditions under which various forms of
mispricing may lead to inefficient capital allocation,288 liquidity
reduction,289 increased risk,290 and skewing the incentives of
management.291 These costs could escalate dramatically as the extent of
mispricings increases during a stock-market bubble.292
Second, the dynamics of an inflating asset-price bubble promote
fraud and other lawbreaking. Scholars have argued that the rise of asset
bubbles throughout different historical periods and countries has been

286. For an extended discussion of the inefficient allocation of resources that
bubbles can cause in emerging markets, see Carlos Massad, Capital Flows in Chile:
Changes and Policies in the 1990s, in FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND THE EMERGING
ECONOMIES 219, 219–223 (José Antonio Ocampo et al. eds., 2000).
287. Kahan, supra note 21, at 988.
288. Overpriced shares allow companies to raise capital for unprofitable projects
(and underpriced shares may deny funding for profitable projects). Id. at 1005–06.
289. Market liquidity may suffer if investors are risk averse to losses from
inaccurate prices. Id. at 1017. In its worst form, this liquidity reduction manifests itself
as a crisis in investor confidence and can precipitate a liquidity crunch (discussed in
greater detail below). See infra notes 288–89 and accompanying text. A liquidity
crunch can lead to further inaccuracies in stock prices. See Kahan, supra note 21, at
992.
290. Inaccurate stock prices may increase stock volatility, and risk-averse
investors may not be able to hedge this risk through diversification. Kahan, supra note
21, at 1025–28.
291. Mispricings may create perverse incentives for managers to take actions
that raise the stock prices of their company even when those actions would lower the
company’s fundamental values. Id. at 1028–34. Kahan also summarizes the
circumstances in which mispricings may skew the market for corporate control, lead to
inefficient terms in contracts between shareholders and managers, and lead to
inefficient capital budgeting by companies. Id. at 1034–41.
292. Id. at 990–92.
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accompanied by epidemics of financial fraud in both stock293 and realestate markets.294 In fact, the dynamics of asset-price booms promote
financial fraud.295 Widespread fraud, in turn, can contribute to a crisis
of investor confidence.296
Third, the bursting of a bubble often has dramatic spillover effects
beyond the specific asset market where prices crashed. Stock or realestate price crashes can lead to a severe credit crunch,297 a term that is
now part of the national vocabulary given the recent subprime-mortgage
crisis.298 Falling prices and tightening credit can erode investor
confidence299 and cause severe economic damage.300 Economists worry
that the collapse of an asset-price bubble can lead to contagion, which
describes how falling prices in one asset market can cause price
collapses and financial instability across other asset classes as well as
international borders.301 Economists worry that many of the same
phenomena that may contribute to the rise of asset-price bubbles—for
example, behavioral biases and feedback loops—reverse dramatically
and destructively during a bubble’s collapse.302
Some economists believe that some asset-price bubbles do not end
in a dramatic price crash but in slower downward leak or stagnation.303
This presents a Faustian tradeoff between the costs of persistent

293. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 37, at 73–90 (surveying historical swindles in
stock and other financial markets during bubbles); Erik F. Gerding, The Next
Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L.
REV. 393, 405–13 (2006).
294. Marc A. Weiss, The Politics of Real Estate Cycles, 20 BUS. & ECON.
HIST. 127, 128 (1991), available at http://www.h-net.org/~business/bhcweb/
publications/BEHprint/v020/p0127-p0135.pdf (stating that the excesses of real-estate
bubbles may include outright business fraud).
295. Gerding, supra note 293, at 424–41.
296. Tamar Frankel, Regulation and Investors’ Trust in the Securities Markets,
68 BROOK. L. REV. 439, 447–48 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence
Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 411–12 (2002).
297. E.g., Michael D. Bordo & Olivier Jeanne, Boom-Busts in Asset Prices,
Economic Instability, and Monetary Policy 11 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8966, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/W8966.pdf.
298. Vikas Bajaj et al., Central Banks Intervene to Calm Volatile Markets,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2007, at A1.
299. Ben Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Monetary Policy and Asset Price
Volatility 29 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8966, 2000),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/W7559.pdf.
300. E.g., Paul Krugman, Dutch Tulips and Emerging Markets, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, July–Aug. 1995, at 28.
301. DIDIER SORNETTE, WHY STOCK MARKETS CRASH: CRITICAL EVENTS IN
COMPLEX FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 309–13 (2003)
302. Id. at 310.
303. Supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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mispricings outlined by Kahan and the costs of asset-price crashes with
all the potential spillover effects mentioned above.
Beyond immediate economic-efficiency costs, the bursting of assetprice bubbles can cause severe social dislocation.304 The rise and
collapse of asset prices also leaves winners and losers. The equitable
effects will depend in large part on which social groups invested in the
asset class, who was “smart money” (i.e., buying low and selling high)
and who did not sell before the crash.
Bursting asset-price bubbles have also sparked the generation of
the most far-reaching financial laws.305 Whether these new laws
represent the evolution of financial law through punctuated equilibria,
or a perverse pattern of underregulation during the rise of bubbles and
re-regulation (and possible overregulation) after the burst of bubbles,
remains open to debate.306

B. The Costs of Antibubble Laws
Given the potentially severe costs of bubbles, policy makers could
take the position that it is worth trying even unproven antibubble laws.
Many of these laws, however, carry their own costs and risks.
1.

DANGERS OF PRICKING

For example, the wisdom of pricking bubbles, even if
policymakers could, is highly questionable. Policymakers face the
initial problem of determining whether a bubble exists,307 which, again,
remains more art than science.308 Assuming policymakers are
comfortable in their ability to detect bubbles, pricking bubbles can
precipitate asset-price crashes with all the negative spillover effects
described above.309 Moreover, pricking asset-price bubbles can pose

304. For a survey of the historical and cultural effects of the bursting of assetprice bubbles, see CHANCELLOR, supra note 56.
305. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation?: 300 Years
of Evidence, 75 WASH U. L.Q. 849, 850 (1997).
306. Compare Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of
United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1 (2002), with Gerding,
supra note 293, at 423–24. For a description of the cycle of the politics of regulation
during the rise and fall of real-estate booms, see Weiss, supra note 294, and Larry E.
Ribstein, Bubble Laws, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 77, 79–83 (2003).
307. See Miller, supra note 175, at 1055.
308. See supra Part II.A.4, C.1.
309. Supra notes 297–302 and accompanying text.
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dire political risks for those seen as responsible for upsetting the
economic applecart.310
2.

DANGERS OF PREVENTING OR DAMPENING ASSET-PRICE BUBBLES

Even laws that would prevent—not prick—bubbles entail serious
costs. Professors Gregory La Blanc and Jeffrey Rachlinski have
advanced several arguments against laws that would restrict the impact
of noise traders on financial markets.311 Their arguments apply to
antibubble laws as well.
First, they argue that restricting noise traders from investing would
deny markets valuable price information contained in the trades of these
investors.312 La Blanc and Rachlinski assume, however, that noise
traders are, on average, correct and that noise-trader mistakes cancel
each other out.313 But evidence from behavioral finance suggests that
noise traders often do not cancel, but rather exacerbate, one another in
positive-feedback trading loops.314
La Blanc and Rachlinski raise a second argument, namely that
investor irrationality benefits asset markets since noise traders provide
liquidity to markets.315 Many antibubble laws are, in fact, designed to
deny liquidity to the market.316 Advocates of these laws might argue
that increasing the cost of raising capital is desirable when markets
suffer from excessive liquidity; antibubble laws may be a necessary and
sobering tonic that refocuses investors away from short-term–positivefeedback investing and towards sustainable long-term investments.317
But this response invites the questions of how much liquidity is too
much, how to distinguish between valuable investment and disfavored
speculation, and where is the appropriate line between disfavored shortterm and favored long-term investment strategies.318
The difficulty differentiating between short-term and long-term
strategies points to a third cost of antibubble laws (not raised by La
310. See Miller, supra note 175, at 1055.
311. La Blanc & Rachlinski, supra note 125, at 565–78.
312. Id. at 567–70.
313. Id. at 568.
314. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
315. La Blanc & Rachlinski, supra note 125, at 565–67.
316. Supra note 11 and accompanying text.
317. Gabaldon, supra note 9.
318. For an article critical of attempts to cure excessive speculation, see
Mahoney, supra note 154. For an article that highlights the tradeoffs in securities law
between serving investors with short-term horizons and those with long-term horizons,
see Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between
Current and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044 (2005).
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Blanc and Rachlinski): by attempting to stifle short-term speculation,
these laws may prevent arbitrageurs and others from engaging in shortterm strategies that would correct mispricings.319
La Blanc and Rachlinski highlight a fourth concern: increasing the
cost of raising capital from noise traders may drive companies to debt
markets. La Blanc and Rachlinski argue that the financial professionals
who make lending decisions suffer from many of the same behavioral
biases that afflict individual equity investors.320 Debt markets also
involve high agency costs, which some economists argue lead to the
formation of asset-price bubbles.321 In fact, La Blanc and Rachlinski
cite several economic studies that found asset-price bubbles arising even
in markets where decisions are made by financial professionals as
opposed to less sophisticated individual investors.322
Not all antibubble laws involve interventions in markets.
Removing short-sale restrictions actually reduces government
involvement in securities markets. But some commentators have noted
that short sales have potential risks, particularly during panics and
cascading defaults.323 Fully enabling arbitrage brings its own set of
risks; some financial analysts worry that the SEC’s repeal of the uptick
test in July 2007 exacerbated financial-market volatility later that
summer.324
3.

LEARNING TO LOVE BUBBLES?

A more subversive critique of efforts to prevent asset-price bubbles
is that bubbles mobilize investments in long-lasting commercial
infrastructure that otherwise might not have been built. This argument
contends that the destructive creativity of bubbles has given countries
extended networks of canals, railroads, air travel, radios, television,
and the Internet, as well as the human capital to run these networks.325

319. SHLEIFER, supra note 35, at 97–102 (describing the benefits of arbitrage).
320. La Blanc & Rachlinski, supra note 125, at 570–74.
321. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
322. La Blanc & Rachlinski, supra note 125, at 575–76.
323. Powers et al., supra note 13, at 246–49 (outlining potential benefits of
short sale restrictions).
324. Emily Chasan, Analysts Fear Shorting Effect, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto)
Aug. 10, 2007, at B12. Given the recency of this repeal, conclusions on its effects
remain premature.
325. For an accessible articulation of this argument, see DANIEL GROSS, POP!:
WHY BUBBLES ARE GREAT FOR THE ECONOMY (2007).
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V. CONCLUSION

Given the numerous costs of antibubble laws, policymakers should
hesitate before implementing a law with questionable effectiveness
absent other policy justifications for the law. Experimental and
empirical evidence suggests that many antibubble laws might be
ineffective or even counterproductive at preventing bubbles or
dampening the severity of asset mispricings during bubbles.
This conclusion does not argue for repeal of antibubble laws.
First, even if they do not eliminate severe mispricings during a bubble,
existing antibubble laws may be effective in correcting less drastic
mispricings.326 But any reduction in the probability or scope of
mispricing would have to be balanced against the costs of antibubble
laws. Second, many antibubble laws and policies have purposes beyond
preventing asset-price bubbles, and their effectiveness in achieving
these other purposes must be evaluated separately.
Experimental asset markets can serve as a valuable tool in
analyzing the effectiveness of securities laws in meeting objectives
other than remedying asset-price bubbles. This Article has provided a
model for evaluating evidence from experimental economics that can be
used for analyzing the effectiveness of a range of other securities and
financial rules. Indeed, experimental economists have moved beyond
bubbles. Recent research in experimental asset markets has focused on
a broad range of financial-regulatory topics, including the impact of
corporate-takeover rules, antifraud rules, and securities-disclosure
rules.327 Moreover, as Kahan notes, many regulations beyond
antibubble laws are concerned with promoting “accurate” prices in
financial markets.328 The ability of economists to measure with certainty
the “accuracy” of prices in experimental asset markets provides all the
more reason for legal scholars to add experimental-asset-market
research to their toolbox.

326. Although many definitions in the economic literature, including those
found in experimental-asset-market research, might consider any departure from
fundamental value a bubble, this Article, like the experimental-asset-market research it
cites, does not consider small deviations of price from fundamental value to be a
bubble.
327. E.g., Charles Bram Cadsby et al., Pooling, Separating, and
Semiseparating Equilibria in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence, 3 REV.
FIN. STUD. 315 (1990); Robert Forsythe et al., Cheap Talk, Fraud, and Adverse
Selection in Financial Markets: Some Experimental Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 481
(1999); Jayant R. Kale & Thomas H. Noe, Unconditional and Conditional Takeover
Offers: Experimental Evidence, 10 REV. FIN. STUD. 735 (1997); Robert Libby et al.,
Experimental Research in Financial Accounting, 27 ACCT. ORG. & SOC’Y 775 (2002).
328. Kahan, supra note 21.

GERDING - FINAL

2007:5

12/5/2007 3:16 PM

Laws Against Bubbles

1037

Of all four categories of antibubble laws, restricting credit is the
most effective method of preventing, pricking, or dampening
bubbles.329 However, empirical data questions the effectiveness of
margin regulations, the prime example of this type of antibubble law, in
real-world markets.330 This may be explained by limitations on the
scope of margin regulations, which allows investors and intermediaries
to sidestep restrictions and obtain credit for stock purchases from other
sources.331
Monetary policy, although not typically a subject for legal
scholarship, appears to be effective in preventing, pricking, and
dampening asset-price bubbles. But monetary policy serves as an
extremely blunt instrument to correct asset prices.332 Monetary policy
can have many goals, including targeting inflation, stimulating
economic growth, and maintaining balances between foreign
currencies.333 Using monetary policy to address asset mispricings can
thus have unintended ripple effects throughout the economy.334 This has
led to a heated debate among macroeconomists and central bankers
about the wisdom of using monetary policy to target asset mispricing.
The differences in effectiveness between margin regulations and
monetary policy creates a dilemma. Margin regulations can narrowly
target credit that spurs the inflation of a specific asset class, but its
narrow tailoring allows investor opportunism that limits the policy’s
effectiveness. Monetary policy eliminates this opportunism by raising
interest rates more broadly, but this broad reach creates unintended
spillover effects. This dilemma argues for greater study into the role
that other legal mechanisms have on restricting or expanding credit,
such as bankruptcy laws,335 and prudential regulations that limit the
ability of financial institutions to invest (or lend to investors) in the
securities or housing markets.336

329. Supra Part III.C.4.
330. See supra notes 282–83 and accompanying text.
331. See supra notes 284–85 and accompanying text.
332. Miller, supra note 175, at 1053–55.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. One interesting question is whether bankruptcy laws that reduce the
protections of debtors from creditors may overstimulate lending and, in turn, leveraged
purchases of assets. For example, what impact did the recent Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified
under Title 11 of the U.S. Code), have on lending from financial institutions to
individuals investing in homes? Did that law contribute to the recent subprime-mortgage
crisis?
336. Members of Congress reacted to the potential threat of a credit crunch
posed by the subprime-mortgage-lending crisis. For example, Senator Schumer argued
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This dilemma points to a greater implication. Given evidence that
prophylactic laws designed to prevent, prick, or dampen bubbles may
be ineffective, counterproductive, or unduly costly, policymakers and
scholars should focus on the effectiveness of financial laws designed to
make the economy more resilient to asset-price crashes. These laws
include prudential regulation of financial institutions; governmentsponsored deposit-insurance programs; and social insurance, such as
Social Security.337 Experimental asset markets are a valuable tool to
evaluate the effectiveness of these laws as well.
One conclusion from the experiments described above already
presents itself: a distinction must be made between regulations that
promote resiliency generally by forcing investors or institutions to hold
certain funds in reserve out of a booming market and those that attempt
to bail out investors who have suffered losses in a bubble crash.
Bailouts might remove too much of the sting from a crash and thus
negate the prophylactic effect demonstrated by experimental asset
markets that investor “experience” of a bubble crash can have on
preventing future bubbles. Experimental asset markets underscore the
cost of moral hazard.
But experimental economics is not merely a tool for testing policy
recommendations. It can also sharpen and reshape theoretical work on
bubbles and asset pricing in general. This Article presents, in a linear
fashion, a path from definition, to theory, to policy, to empirical and
experimental evaluation of that policy. A better metaphor might be a
loop in which evidence from the laboratory and field feeds back into
refinements of theories. For example, the fact that bubbles still formed
in experimental asset markets that prohibited resale suggests that
bubbles may be driven by more than just investor expectations that
flipping assets will lead to capital gains.338 Building and testing
economic theories is an iterative process.339
Developing better theories, as well as better empirical and
experimental tests, requires careful consideration of the differences
between modeling decision making under risk compared to decision

for easing the regulations restricting the levels of mortgages that Freddie Mac and
Fannie Mae may purchase (and ultimately securitize) to inject liquidity into the primemortgage market. Eric Dash, Fannie Mae’s Offer to Help Ease Credit Squeeze Is
Rejected, as Critics Complain of Opportunism, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2007, at C1
(reporting that the regulator of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae rejected this proposal).
337.
Carmichael & Esho, supra note 232, at 481 (discussing interaction of
financial institution regulation and asset-price bubbles); SHILLER, supra note 15, at 220–
22 (analyzing Social Security reform in light of recurring asset-price bubbles).
338. Lei et al., supra note 137.
339. For a compelling argument on the way theory, experimental research, and
empirical inquiry should work together, see Smith, supra note 33, at 923–34.
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making under uncertainty. This crucial difference has remained
underexplored in both legal and economic research, yet modeling
decision making under uncertainty is at the cutting edge of economic
research. Economists are refocusing on basic research regarding
decision making under uncertainty in order to improve economic
models.340
It would be dangerous to make assumptions regarding where this
research might lead. Accordingly, evidence of the imperfection of
markets does not necessarily justify market interventions. In fact, much
of the experimental and empirical evidence that supports the possibility
that bubbles recur in real-world asset markets also draws into question
whether policy interventions can do much to remedy this. Nonetheless,
this Article corrects a popular oversimplification that behavioral-finance
and behavioral-law-and-economics scholarship always support
intervention to address market failures.341

340. Professor Athey, for example, has created models for decision making
under conditions of uncertainty that show how individuals value and react to increased
information. Susan Athey, Monotone Comparative Statics Under Uncertainty, 117 Q.J.
ECON. 187 (2002).
341. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.

